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The German Chancellor, the French President, and the British Prime Minis-
ter have each grabbed world headlines with pronouncements that their states’ 
policies of multiculturalism have failed. As so often, domestic debates about mul-
ticulturalism, as well as foreign policy debates about human rights in non-
Western countries, revolve around the treatment of women. Yet feminists are no 
longer even certain how to frame, let alone resolve, the issues raised by veiling, 
polygamy, and other cultural practices oppressive to women by Western stan-
dards. Feminism has become perplexed by the very concept of “culture.” This 
impasse is detrimental both to women’s equality and to concerns for cultural au-
tonomy. 
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We propose shifting gears. Our approach draws on what, at first glance, 
would seem to be an unpromising legal paradigm for feminism—the highly tech-
nical field of conflict of laws (conflicts). Using the nonintuitive hypothetical of a 
dispute in California between a Japanese father and daughter over a transfer of 
shares, we demonstrate the contribution that conflicts can make. Whereas West-
ern feminists are often criticized for dwelling on “exotic” cultural practices to the 
neglect of other important issues affecting the lives of women in those communi-
ties or states, our choice of this hypothetical not only joins the correctives, but al-
so shows how economic issues, in fact, take us back to the same impasse. Even 
mundane issues of corporate law prove to be dizzyingly indeterminate and com-
plex in their feminist and cultural dimensions. 
What makes conflict of laws a better way to recognize and do justice to the 
different dimensions of our hypothetical, surprisingly, is viewing conflicts as 
technique. More generally, conflicts can offer a new approach to the femin-
ism/culture debate—if we treat its technicalities not as mere means to an end but 
as an intellectual style. Trading the big picture typical of public law for the speci-
ficity and constraint of technical form provides a promising style of capturing, 
revealing, and ultimately taking a stand on the complexities confronting feminists 
as multiculturalism is challenged here and abroad. 
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INTRODUCTION 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Nicholas Sarkozy, 
and British Prime Minister David Cameron have each grabbed world headlines 
of late with pronouncements that their states’ efforts to create a multicultural 
society have failed. “Utterly failed,” according to Merkel in a speech to young 
members of her party in October 2010, asserting that the onus should be on 
immigrants to do more to integrate into German society.1 “Oui, c’est un échec,” 
Sarkozy responded bluntly in a February 2011 televised exchange with vot-
ers2—puzzling those who noted that France has been relatively inflexible about 
minorities’ cultural practices, banning headscarves in schools and preparing to 
introduce a separate ban on face veils in all public places.3 In announcing he 
would soon present new policies designed to strengthen Britain’s collective 
identity, David Cameron was equally hard hitting:  
 State multiculturalism is a wrong-headed doctrine that has had disastrous 
results. 
. . . . 
 Take forced marriages. In Bradford, where I was last week, schoolgirls un-
der the age of sixteen have simply disappeared from school. Nobody knows 
where they are.  
 And, until recently, there was little investigation—despite the fact that it is 
likely that they may have been drugged, imprisoned, kidnapped and forced in-
to an unwanted marriage on the other side of the world.4 
 
 1. Matthew Weaver, Angela Merkel: German Multiculturalism Has “Utterly Failed,” 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 17, 2010, 6:58 AM EDT), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/17/ 
angela-merkel-german-multiculturalism-failed. 
 2. Agence France-Presse, Multiculturalism Has Failed, Says French President, 
DAILYMOTION (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xgzqs8_multiculturalism 
-has-failed-says-french-president_news (“Yes, it’s a failure.”). 
 3. See Ruadhán Mac Cormaic, Sarkozy Denounces Multiculturalism as “a Failure,” 
IR. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2011, at 11, available at http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/ 
2011/0212/1224289636274.html. 
 4. Andrew Sparrow, Cameron Attacks “State Multiculturalism,” GUARDIAN (Feb. 26, 
2008, 10:58 AM EST), http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2008/feb/26/conservatives.race. 
In 2010, the British government’s Forced Marriages Unit gave advice or support related to a 
possible forced marriage in 1735 cases. Forced Marriage, FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH 
OFF., http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/when-things-go-wrong/forced         
-marriage (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). 
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Headscarves, face veils, the British prime minister’s sensationalist example 
of schoolgirls drugged and dragged off to a forced marriage in a backward 
country—as so often, domestic debates about the limits of multiculturalism re-
volve around the treatment of women. Much the same is true of foreign policy 
debates about human rights in non-Western countries. Consider, for example, 
that an independent bipartisan U.S. federal government commission that moni-
tors other countries’ compliance with the international human right to religious 
freedom has emerged as a persistent critic of Islamic countries for their viola-
tions of women’s equality.5 
In contrast to such political resolve, however, there seems to be widespread 
if awkward agreement that Western academic feminism has become bogged 
down in the problem of “culture.”6 By the problem of culture, we mean not that 
actual cultures have proved resistant to efforts to further gender equality (al-
though that is also the case), but that as understandings of the concept of cul-
ture have changed, it has become more and more complicated to frame, let 
alone resolve, the issues raised by veiling, clitoridectomy, polygamy, and other 
cultural practices considered oppressive to women by Western standards. Is the 
question whether to give our commitment to gender equality precedence over 
claims that a practice is fundamental to a culture—or is it actually a question of 
competing cultures? Do Western feminists fail to recognize the choices made 
by women in other cultures and, conversely, the cultural conditioning of their 
own? What should we do when confronted with internal disagreements over 
what is fundamental to another culture? And so on.  
It is not a stretch to say that the much-noted brain drain from feminism is 
partly due to the intellectual and ethical morass the “feminism/culture” debate 
has become.7 “Everywhere I go,” Janet Halley has written, “women complain 
to me that academic feminism has lost its zing. Many of the key intellectual 
figures in feminism have decamped to other endeavors.”8 Indeed, Halley her-
self argues that feminists should “take a break from feminism.”9 
As Martha Minow has put it, the debate over women and cultural accom-
modation has become a number of predictable moves in a game.10 In Part I of 
 
 5. See Karen Knop, International Law and the Disaggregated Democratic State: Two 
Case Studies on Women’s Human Rights and the United States, in WE, THE PEOPLE(S): 
PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNANCE 75, 78 (Claire Charters & Dean R. Knight eds., 2011). 
 6. See, e.g., ANNE PHILLIPS, MULTICULTURALISM WITHOUT CULTURE 1 (2007). 
 7. We use the term “feminism/culture” to encompass the range of positions taken in 
the debate and the term “feminism versus culture” to refer specifically to the position that 
feminist values conflict with concerns for cultural autonomy. See, e.g., infra text accompa-
nying note 21. 
 8. JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM 
FEMINISM 340 (2006). 
 9. See id. passim. 
 10. Martha Minow, About Women, About Culture: About Them, About Us, DAEDALUS, 
Fall 2000, at 125, 129; see also id. at 134-35 (working through the iterations of the norma-
tive challenges to liberal feminists from culture defenders). 
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this Article, we trace a succession of challenges for legal feminism caused by 
developments in how culture is conceived, culminating with the post-
essentialist idea of culture as “invented tradition.” Along the way, we highlight 
a number of important insights and fault lines that emerge from the femin-
ism/culture debate and also several common strategies for resolving the issue. 
In the subsequent Parts, we suggest a way to engage in the practical politi-
cal work of feminism in an intellectually vibrant fashion and, in particular, a 
way to both build on the insights of the feminism/culture debate and gain some 
critical leverage on it rather than “take a break.” The path we propose draws on 
an unlikely legal paradigm—conflict of laws. Conflict of laws is the part of pri-
vate law that deals with cases having a foreign element. “Foreign element” 
simply means a connection to some legal system other than that of the jurisdic-
tion in which the case is being tried, the other jurisdiction being either a foreign 
state or another subdivision of the same state. The contract in dispute might be 
made with a foreign company, for example, or the lawsuit might concern the 
ownership of property situated abroad. The questions that conflict of laws an-
swers are whether a court can and should hear a case with a foreign element, 
and if so, what law it should apply. That is, a court must first decide whether it 
has jurisdiction, given that the case could potentially be tried elsewhere instead. 
Once the court has taken jurisdiction, conflicts governs the choice of law ques-
tion: namely, whether the court applies its own law to some or all of the issues, 
as opposed to the law of another jurisdiction connected to the case. A Canadian 
court might apply U.S. tort law, for example, or a Maryland court might apply 
South Dakota contract law. 
At first glance, the conventional associations of conflicts make it seem un-
promising for feminism/culture issues. For one, although conflict of laws does 
deal with the area of the family, in U.S. legal circles it is more often associated 
with issues such as out-of-state car accidents, cross-border products liability, 
and international antitrust litigation than with issues commonly coded as cul-
tural.11 We start, however, by illustrating that the day-to-day areas of work and 
the economy that make up the nuts-and-bolts issues of private law can raise 
feminism/culture issues as well. Part II introduces a hypothetical case based on 
 
 11. Prominent issues in a 2010 survey of cases in U.S. courts include traffic accidents, 
car-owner’s liability, employment-related torts, medical malpractice, worker’s compensa-
tion, and child support. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts 
in 2010: Twenty-Fourth Annual Survey, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 303, 337-49, 368-85 (2011). 
Conflicts has recently become relevant to issues of sexuality because it governs the rec-
ognition of foreign or out-of-state same-sex unions. See generally ANDREW KOPPELMAN, 
SAME SEX, DIFFERENT STATES: WHEN SAME-SEX MARRIAGES CROSS STATE LINES (2006); 
Peter Hay, Recognition of Same-Sex Legal Relationships in the United States, 54 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 257 (2006). However, friend and foe alike treat conflicts as a way station en route 
to the legalization of same-sex marriage and not as a valuable paradigm in and of itself. An 
exception is Janet Halley, Behind the Law of Marriage, Part II: Travelling Marriage, 8 
UNBOUND (forthcoming 2012). See also Ralf Michaels, After the Revolution—Decline and 
Return of U.S. Conflict of Laws, 11 Y.B. PRIVATE INT’L L. 11, 21-22 (2009).  
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an actual dispute litigated in California between a Japanese father and daughter 
over a transfer of shares. Our choice of example thus cuts against the often-
criticized tendency of Western feminists to focus on “exotic” ethical questions 
such as veiling and clitoridectomy that are usually the province of constitution-
al law or international human rights law, to the neglect of questions about the 
economic conditions of women in other cultures.12 It also shows that econom-
ics, in fact, takes us back to the same feminism/culture debate.13 Even mundane 
aspects of corporate law prove to be dizzyingly indeterminate and complex in 
their feminist and cultural dimensions. 
What makes conflict of laws seem particularly counterintuitive as a method 
for dealing with conflicts of feminism and culture, though, is not the kinds of 
private law issues it brings to mind, but its highly technical nature. The field 
has famously been described as a “dismal swamp . . . inhabited by learned but 
eccentric professors who theorize about mysterious matters in a strange and in-
comprehensible jargon.”14 Yet a court required to apply foreign law in a con-
flicts case runs up against the same “how different is too different” question 
that confronts feminists in any instance of feminism/culture—the ethical mo-
ment at which some feminists will decide that compromise with or tolerance of 
cultural difference ends. In contrast to feminism/culture analyses, however, a 
conflicts analysis gets to that ethical moment only after going through a series 
of technical steps. We will show that far from being a shortcoming of the field, 
these technicalities bring to the fore a vital level of detail that feminism/culture 
analyses must generate from first principles—and seldom achieve. Moreover, 
we argue that as a matter of sociology of knowledge, adhering to the constraints 
of form that characterize conflicts technicalities more often opens up an alter-
native resolution, or indeed alternative questions for theory and practice, and 
hence renders the “how different is too different” question less inevitable. 
Thus the fruitfulness of conflicts lies in viewing it as technique. By “tech-
nique,” we mean the technical aspect of law, particularly although not uniquely 
 
 12. See, e.g., Cyra Akila Choudhury, Exporting Subjects: Globalizing Family Law 
Progress Through International Human Rights, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 259, 307-09 (2011); 
Karen Engle, International Human Rights and Feminisms: When Discourses Keep Meeting, 
in INTERNATIONAL LAW: MODERN FEMINIST APPROACHES 47, 65-66 (Doris Buss & Ambree-
na Manji eds., 2005); Leti Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 
1181, 1204-05, 1208-10 (2001); Sally Engle Merry, Human Rights Law and the Demoniza-
tion of Culture (and Anthropology Along the Way), POLAR, May 2003, at 55, 58, 63-64. 
 13. Cf. Vasuki Nesiah, The Ground Beneath Her Feet: TWAIL Feminisms, in THE 
THIRD WORLD AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER: LAW, POLITICS AND GLOBALIZATION 133, 140-41 
(Antony Anghie et al. eds., 2003) (agreeing that a focus on women’s material well-being is 
needed to correct for the damaging tendency to frame all questions about third world femin-
ism in terms of universalism versus cultural relativism, but arguing that this contrast of the 
economic to the cultural may miss the ways in which economic systems reflect cultural prac-
tices). 
 14. William L. Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REV. 959, 971 (1953). 
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present in private law, which foregrounds questions of form. The technical as-
pect of law encompasses: 
(1) certain ideologies—legal instrumentalism and managerialism . . . (2) cer-
tain categories of experts—especially scholars, bureaucrats and practitioners 
who treat the law as a kind of tool or machine and who see themselves as 
modest but expertly devoted technicians; (3) a problem-solving paradigm—an 
orientation toward defining concrete, practical problems and toward crafting 
solutions; (4) a form of reasoning and argumentation, from eight-part tests to 
reasoning by analogy, to the production of stock types of policy arguments to 
practices of statutory interpretation or citation to case law.15 
In this approach, “[l]egal knowledge is certainly not an end in itself—it always 
has a larger purpose. But at the same time, it is also not simply a pass-through 
to an economic or social end.”16 
When the doctrines and larger moves of conflicts are approached in this 
mode—when its technicalities are treated as an intellectual style—conflicts can 
offer a fresh approach to the feminism/culture debate. As our definition of 
technique suggests, we have in mind the broader conflicts tradition in which its 
adepts are schooled, rather than the conflicts method often encountered in the 
United States, which is more narrowly understood as either interest analysis or 
the most significant relationship test. That said, we focus on those aspects of 
the tradition that hold out the greatest promise for the feminism/culture debate. 
In Part III, we illustrate our argument by working through our hypothetical 
dispute between father and daughter again, this time in accordance with a con-
flict of laws analysis, showing how conflicts navigates the indeterminacy and 
complexity of the cultural and feminist dimensions seen in Part II. Part III de-
monstrates that conflict of laws captures and operationalizes important insights 
of feminist thinking on culture that we identify in Part I—summing up some-
thing in the air about how we approach these issues now. Yet, as Part III goes 
on to show, conflicts also reveals new possibilities. As a result, it provides a 
way for feminists to acknowledge the complexity of culture without becoming 
bogged down. While we explain the kind of work that each step in a conflict of 
laws analysis would do in resolving our hypothetical dispute, we do not pro-
pose an actual resolution in this Article because our goal is to show the promise 
of a style, not to stand for a particular result. That is, we believe that changing 
the tools with which we think can open up the ways in which we theorize and 
ultimately master seemingly familiar problems. 
In elaborating on our approach, Part IV engages a potential objection: are 
we not ignoring the legal realists’ lesson that technicalities often obscure or di-
lute political conflict? Our answer lies in a final reason why conflict of laws is 
both a surprising and a promising resource for the feminism/culture debate. 
Conflicts was once in the very vanguard of the realist revolution, but is now 
 
 15. ANNELISE RILES, COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE: LEGAL REASONING IN THE GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL MARKETS 64-65 (2011). 
 16. Id. at 70. 
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most often presented as layers of unsatisfactory yet not quite discarded theories. 
Yet, as we explain, this means that the discipline comes with built-in critiques; 
it is self-conscious about its use of form. 
In Part V, we contrast the conflict of laws style with the familiar strategies 
in the feminism/culture debate featured in Part I. Conflicts thus offers a third 
contribution: it furnishes a critical vantage point on the state of feminist legal 
theory and its engagement with culture, enabling us to join with others who 
have questioned the familiar strategies, and offering one picture of an alterna-
tive. 
I. HOW FEMINISM BECAME ENTANGLED IN THE CONCEPT OF CULTURE 
Feminism has been described as “becoming prone to paralysis by cultural 
difference, with anxieties about cultural imperialism engendering a kind of re-
lativism that [has] made it difficult to represent any belief or practice as oppres-
sive to women or at odds with gender equality.”17 How did feminism get to this 
impasse? The story has been told in many ways.18 In this Part, we tell it as one 
of complexity produced by feminist engagements with changing conceptions of 
culture. 
The account offered here relies both on discussions of multicultural states, 
where the issue is to what extent the law should recognize the value of a minor-
ity’s culture or its autonomy if the minority’s norms conflict with gender equal-
ity, and on discussions of international law, where the issue also sounds in so-
vereignty and nonintervention.19 As our focus is primarily on successive 
approaches to culture taken by legal feminists and feminists influential in the 
legal literature, our account does not attempt to summarize the full debates on 
the roles of culture and multiculturalism, nor to incorporate the trajectory of 
feminist legal theory beyond its engagement with this problem.20 
A.  Feminism Versus Culture: Equality > Culture 
Susan Moller Okin’s essay Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? is an ele-
gant and prominent example of the initial framing of the issue as feminism ver-
 
 17. PHILLIPS, supra note 6, at 1. 
 18. Helpful accounts include Engle, supra note 12, analyzing the challenges of third 
world feminists to liberal and structural bias feminists in the context of international human 
rights, and Minow, supra note 10. 
 19. In this Article, we use “culture” broadly to include religion and sexuality. By dis-
cussing culture in both the multicultural and transnational contexts, we are not implying any 
particular correspondence between a culture as it exists in its country of origin and as it ex-
ists in the diaspora. 
 20. We indicate in Parts III-V where our approach might join with feminist methods 
that have not figured prominently in the legal literature on feminism/culture. 
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sus culture.21 The insight here is that there is an ethical moment, as we will call 
it, a hard choice to be made between two sets of values. And for Okin, al-
though not for all feminists who frame the choice this way, equality always 
trumps. 
By multiculturalism, Okin means the claim made in some Western liberal 
democracies that minority cultures are not sufficiently protected by ensuring 
the individual rights (such as freedom of association or religion) of their mem-
bers, and that minority cultures should therefore also be protected by recogniz-
ing the special rights of these groups as groups.22 Okin argues not only that 
“[m]ost cultures are suffused with practices and ideologies concerning gend-
er,”23 but that most also have as a principal aim the control of women by 
men.24 Over time, some traditionally patriarchal cultures, principally Western 
liberal cultures, have become more egalitarian than others.25 These basic facts 
about culture should alert us to the potential for conflict between multicultural-
ism and feminism, where feminism is understood as “the belief that wom-
en . . . should be recognized as having human dignity equal to that of men, and 
that they should have the opportunity to live as fulfilling and as freely chosen 
lives as men can.”26 Group rights endanger the equal rights of women within 
the group because collective rights are often claimed by minorities with cul-
tures that are more patriarchal than the surrounding culture.27 Okin illustrates 
with an example from French immigration policy. Although polygamy is illegal 
in France, the French government in the 1980s granted immigrant men permis-
sion to bring multiple wives into the country, even though many wives them-
selves proved to be strongly opposed to the practice.28 If we agree that women 
should not be disadvantaged because of their sex, Okin argues, we should not 
accept group rights that allow practices oppressive to women on the grounds 
that these practices are fundamental to the preservation of minority cultures. 
On an Okin-style analysis, the ethical moment comes immediately: equali-
ty trumps culture. This is the academic formulation of a position shared by 
much mainstream political discourse, including the politicians cited in our In-
troduction. It also resonates with key universal human rights instruments. For 
example, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights pro-
vides that “[i]n those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities 
exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in 
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, 
 
 21. Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, in IS 
MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 7 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999). 
 22. Id. at 10-11. 
 23. Id. at 12. 
 24. Id. at 13. 
 25. Id. at 16. 
 26. Id. at 10. 
 27. See id. at 17. 
 28. Id. at 9-10. 
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to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.”29 This 
right has been interpreted as giving fairly robust protections to groups.30 In ad-
dition, if “minorities” are also recognized as “peoples”—indigenous groups, for 
instance31—they have a right of self-determination under the Covenant, by vir-
tue of which “they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development.”32 Equality trumps, however, be-
cause the Covenant contains several articles on nondiscrimination and, in par-
ticular, an umbrella article requiring states “to ensure the equal right of men 
and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the 
present Covenant.”33 
Whereas many feminist activists and academics continue to frame the con-
flict as equality versus culture, some do not give all of the trumps to equality.34 
Instead, compromise and tolerance are two common strategies. The aim of 
compromise is to find the right balance between equality and culture.35 The 
other culture may be tolerated, but only to a certain degree. To quote Duncan 
Kennedy’s description of this legal consciousness:  
When an identity is recognized, it will be through a typically contemporary 
mix of highly formal norms, of equality and nondiscrimination, with a highly 
negotiated, ad hoc set of norms, about tolerance or accommodation for identity 
defining practices like “sodomy” and the veil . . . . In other words, public law 
 
 29. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 27, opened for signature 
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; see also id. art. 18 (guaranteeing 
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion). 
 30. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 23, General Com-
ment Adopted by the Human Rights Committee Under Article 40, Paragraph 4, of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ¶¶ 6.1, 6.2, 7, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5 (Apr. 26, 1994). 
 31. Cf. Mahuika v. New Zealand, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 
547/1993, ¶ 9.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993 (Nov. 16, 2000). 
 32. ICCPR, supra note 29, art. 1. 
 33. ICCPR, supra note 29, art. 3; see also id. arts. 2, 26; U.N. Human Rights Comm., 
General Comment No. 28, Equality of Rights Between Men and Women, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 (Mar. 29, 2000). Compare United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, arts. 4-5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 
13, 2007) (indigenous peoples have the right to “autonomy or self-government” and to 
“maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural institu-
tions”), with id. arts. 44, 46(3) (equality trumps). Not surprisingly, the most demanding 
trumping provisions are found in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women, arts. 1-5, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 
(providing for transformative as well as formal substantive equality for women). On trans-
formative equality, see RIKKI HOLTMAAT & JONNEKE NABER, WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
CULTURE: FROM DEADLOCK TO DIALOGUE 25-43 (2011). 
 34. See, e.g., Engle, supra note 12, at 63-64 & n.57 (describing convergence on a sort 
of middle ground she encompasses with the term “culturally sensitive universalism”). 
 35. See, e.g., Karima Bennoune, Secularism and Human Rights: A Contextual Analysis 
of Headscarves, Religious Expression, and Women’s Equality Under International Law, 45 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 367, 396-97 (2007). 
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neoformalism combined with conflicting considerations (balancing, proportio-
nality).36 
In the international context of human rights and domestic violence, Sally 
Engle Merry similarly describes activists, reformers, and policymakers alike as 
“constantly tack[ing] between the goals of respecting cultural diversity and pro-
tecting women’s safety. They use pragmatic compromise and situationally de-
termined decision-making.”37 
 Balancing is sometimes done through a multifactor test, rather than ad hoc. 
For example, Karima Bennoune’s approach to the issue of headscarves or other 
“modest” garments for Muslim women and girls in public educational institu-
tions involves the consideration of multiple factors in context, including the 
impact on other women or girls of wearing the headscarf or other garments, 
coercion of women by religious extremist organizations or other groups, related 
violence against women, the motivations of those imposing a dress restriction, 
Islamophobia or religious discrimination, alternatives to restrictions, possible 
consequences for human rights both of restrictions and of a lack thereof, and 
whether the relevant constituencies have been consulted.38 This combination of 
factors, she asserts, is “more likely to produce substantively rights-friendly re-
sults for the most women and girls in the long run.”39  
It is important to note that such positions between equality and culture may 
reflect stable normative preferences as between the two, or they may instead be 
a starting position aimed at the real-world transformation of other societies or 
states in the direction of equality. Since most of these positions seek to incorpo-
rate some or all of the critical developments in the understanding of culture, we 
will return to them after introducing these developments. 
B. Relativist Critiques of Feminism: Culture Versus Culture 
Framing the issue as equality versus culture soon drew cultural relativist 
critiques. The target of the relativist critiques is the underlying assumption that 
“‘culture’ is what nonliberal peoples are . . . ruled and ordered by . . . . [W]e 
have culture while they are a culture. Or, we are a democracy while they are a 
culture.”40 In other words, liberal arguments about equality, including Okin’s, 
 
 36. Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000, in 
THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19, 67 (David M. 
Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006). Janet Halley argues that the idea of rights always in 
need of balancing also describes the legal consciousness introduced into U.S. family law by 
the feminist interventions that significantly transformed the field from the 1970s onward. See 
Janet Halley, What Is Family Law? A Genealogy (pt. 2), 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 189, 269-
71 (2011). 
 37. SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE 25-26 (2006). 
 38. Bennoune, supra note 35, at 396. 
 39. Id. at 396. 
 40. WENDY BROWN, REGULATING AVERSION: TOLERANCE IN THE AGE OF IDENTITY AND 
EMPIRE 150-51 (2006). 
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do not actually stand outside and above culture. Rather, liberalism is itself a 
culture, and, thus, what are pitted against one another are two cultures.41 This 
leaves no neutral viewpoint from which to comment on, let alone intervene in, 
another culture, whether for reasons of gender equality or other liberal reasons. 
We will call this basic insight seeing culture. 
A related but distinct critique of this assumption stems from self-reflexivity. 
In anthropology, self-reflexivity is the idea that the anthropologist must put 
herself in the frame; she must be as much the subject of her study as the people 
among whom she does her fieldwork.42 While not necessarily subscribing to 
the relativists’ broadening of culture to include democracy or liberalism, self-
reflexive feminists reject the assumption that we can make choices about our 
lives because our culture is just something we have, whereas others’ lives are 
determined by their culture (they are its victims) because culture is what they 
are. These authors criticize Western feminists for tending to see culture as the 
explanation for gender oppression within non-Western communities, while fail-
ing to see women in the West as likewise culturally situated.43 Critics point to 
Western examples such as the premium placed on women’s beauty, thinness, 
and youth and the greater prevalence of cosmetic surgery among Western 
women as compared to Western men.44 They argue that Western women’s fo-
cus on appearance is wrongly understood as an individual choice, rather than a 
culturally conditioned one—a personal penchant for high heels as opposed to 
Chinese foot-binding.45 Meanwhile, women elsewhere are wrongly depicted as 
 
 41. See id.; see also MERRY, supra note 37, at 16, 228-29 (criticizing the assumption 
that “villages are full of culture” whereas international human rights law operates in a cul-
ture-free zone, and arguing that international human rights law itself should be understood 
primarily as a cultural system); Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women and the 
“Cultural Defense,” 17 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 57, 78 (1994) (observing that arguments prec-
luding the judicial recognition of culture forget that the “legal system already has a culture”). 
 42. See ROY WAGNER, THE INVENTION OF CULTURE (rev. & expanded ed. 1981). For 
an application to feminist legal theory, see, for example, Brenda Cossman, Turning the Gaze 
Back on Itself: Comparative Law, Feminist Legal Studies, and the Postcolonial Project, 
1997 UTAH L. REV. 525, 527-28. 
 43. See, e.g., UMA NARAYAN, DISLOCATING CULTURES: IDENTITIES, TRADITIONS, AND 
THIRD-WORLD FEMINISM (1997); Inderpal Grewal, “Women’s Rights as Human Rights”: 
Feminist Practices, Global Feminism, and Human Rights Regimes in Transnationality, 3 
CITIZENSHIP STUD. 337 (1999); Isabelle R. Gunning, Arrogant Perception, World-Travelling 
and Multicultural Feminism: The Case of Female Genital Surgeries, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. 
L. REV. 189 (1992); Audrey Macklin, Particularized Citizenship: Encultured Women and the 
Public Sphere, in MIGRATIONS AND MOBILITIES: CITIZENSHIP, BORDERS, AND GENDER 276, 
291-92 (Seyla Benhabib & Judith Resnik eds., 2009); Naomi Mezey, Law’s Culture and 
Lived Culture: A Comment on Roger Cotterrell’s “The Struggle for Law: Some Dilemmas of 
Cultural Legality,” 4 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 395, 397-98 (2009); Volpp, supra note 12, at 
1186-89, 1212-14, 1217. 
 44. It should be pointed out that Okin herself does not overlook the gendered nature of 
Western culture, and, indeed, gives these examples. Okin, supra note 21, at 16. 
 45. For a feminist account of Chinese foot-binding that accents women’s agency, see 
DOROTHY KO, EVERY STEP A LOTUS: SHOES FOR BOUND FEET (2001). On whether high heels 
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lacking agency and thus unable to exercise any degree of choice with regard to 
their culture.46 Indeed, some non-Western cultural practices, such as veiling, 
which seem thoroughly discriminatory in the eyes of Western feminists, are 
shown to be circumscribed but carefully calibrated personalized choices within 
certain Islamic contexts.47 
Self-reflexivity thus leads to the insight which we will term culture and 
agency. Recognizing that women in other cultures are not simply victims in 
need of saving introduces the principle of choice into the feminism/culture de-
bate, to be balanced against the principle of equality. But this, in turn, leads to 
what Martha Minow describes as endless “dueling accusations of false con-
sciousness” between liberals and cultural defenders: “You say that women in 
my culture have false consciousness, but you say this because of your own false 
consciousness—or I think this because of my own false consciousness, and so 
forth.”48 
The insights of self-reflexivity and of culture and agency are sometimes 
revealed through a hypothetical cross-cultural dialogue. In María Lugones’s 
well-known words, “Through travelling to other people’s ‘worlds’ we discover 
that there are ‘worlds’ in which those who are the victims of arrogant percep-
tion are really subjects, lively beings, resistors, constructors of visions . . . .”49 
This is dialogue for the purpose of cross-cultural understanding, to be distin-
guished from dialogue as a common strategy for transforming cultures, which 
we will discuss later.50 
 
and other fashion items represent oppression or empowerment, compare NAOMI WOLF, THE 
BEAUTY MYTH: HOW IMAGES OF BEAUTY ARE USED AGAINST WOMEN (1991), and ANGELA 
MCROBBIE, THE AFTERMATH OF FEMINISM: GENDER, CULTURE AND SOCIAL CHANGE (2009), 
with Jennifer Baumgardner & Amy Richards, Feminism and Femininity: Or How We 
Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Thong, in ALL ABOUT THE GIRL: CULTURE, POWER, 
AND IDENTITY 59 (Anita Harris ed., 2004). 
 46. For the criticism about lack of agency, see, for example, RATNA KAPUR, The Tra-
gedy of Victimisation Rhetoric: Resurrecting the “Native” Subject in Internation-
al/Postcolonial Feminist Legal Politics, in EROTIC JUSTICE: LAW AND THE NEW POLITICS OF 
POSTCOLONIALISM 95 (2005); Saba Mahmood, Feminist Theory, Embodiment, and the Do-
cile Agent: Some Reflections on the Egyptian Islamic Revival, 16 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 
202 (2001); and Volpp, supra note 12, at 1192, 1211-12. But see Michelle A. McKinley, 
Cultural Culprits, 24 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 91, 114-15 (2009) (cautioning against 
“over-agentivizing”). 
 47. See, e.g., Lama Abu Odeh, Post-Colonial Feminism and the Veil: Thinking the 
Difference, 43 FEMINIST REV., Spring 1993, at 26; see also PASCALE FOURNIER, MUSLIM 
MARRIAGE IN WESTERN COURTS: LOST IN TRANSPLANTATION (2010) (analyzing the mahr—an 
amount promised to the Muslim bride by the Muslim groom as a condition of a valid Islamic 
marriage—as a tool of relative bargaining power between husband and wife). 
 48. Minow, supra note 10, at 131. 
 49. María Lugones, Playfulness, “World”-Travelling, and Loving Perception, in 
MAKING FACE, MAKING SOUL: HACIENDO CARAS 390, 402 (Gloria Anzaldúa ed., 1990). 
 50. See infra notes 68-69, 229-31, and accompanying text. 
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C. Post-Essentialist Critiques of Culture: Taking Apart Cultures 
A later line of critique, what we might term the post-essentialist critique, 
also takes issue with the meaning of culture at work in the Okin-style opposi-
tion of equality and culture, but in a different way. It aims at the underlying as-
sumption that culture is associated with settled tradition and fixity, the assump-
tion that it is monolithic and static. The post-essentialist critique derives from 
the more recent anthropological insight that culture is indeed tradition, but it is 
“invented” tradition.51 Invention is not meant here in the negative sense of arti-
fice, but in the sense that culture is a dynamic practice of making and remaking 
meanings that are provisional, shifting, and partial.52 If this is so, then cultures 
are contestable and negotiable. They involve agency.53 Moreover, they may in-
ternalize outside influences and impositions or may borrow and appropriate 
ideas; in short, they may be hybrid, rather than pure.54 
Lovelace v. Canada, decided by the U.N. Human Rights Committee in 
1981, is a good illustration of the different conclusions about a cultural claim 
that might follow from a post-essentialist conception of culture.55 Sandra Love-
lace lost her status and rights as a Maliseet Indian because she had “married 
out” to a non-Indian, which would not have changed her status or rights had she 
been an Indian man. The Lovelace case is most often portrayed as a conflict be-
 
 51. See THE INVENTION OF TRADITION (Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds., Canto 
ed. 1992); NICHOLAS THOMAS, IN OCEANIA: VISIONS, ARTIFACTS, HISTORIES 17-18, 186 
(1997); Charles L. Briggs, The Politics of Discursive Authority in Research on the “Inven-
tion of Tradition,” 11 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 435, 435-36 (1996); Richard Handler & 
Jocelyn Linnekin, Tradition, Genuine or Spurious, 97 J. AM. FOLKLORE 273 (1984); Allan 
Hanson, The Making of the Maori: Culture Invention and Its Logic, 91 AM. 
ANTHROPOLOGIST 890 (1989); Jean Jackson, Is There a Way to Talk About Making Culture 
Without Making Enemies?, 14 DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 127, 127 (1989); Roger M. 
Keesing, Creating the Past: Custom and Identity in the Contemporary Pacific, 1 CONTEMP. 
PAC. 19, 19-20 (1989); Stephanie Lawson, The Tyranny of Tradition: Critical Reflections on 
Nationalist Narratives in the South Pacific, in NARRATIVES OF NATION IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC 
27 (Ton Otto & Nicholas Thomas eds., 1997); Jocelyn S. Linnekin, Defining Tradition: Var-
iations on the Hawaiian Identity, 10 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 241 (1983); Thomas Spear, Neo-
Traditionalism and the Limits of Invention in British Colonial Africa, 44 J. AFR. HIST. 3 
(2003); S.N. Eisenstadt, Post-Traditional Societies and the Continuity and Reconstruction of 
Tradition, 102 DAEDALUS, Winter 1973, at 1, 5. 
 52. See Rosemary J. Coombe, Contingent Articulations: A Critical Cultural Studies of 
Law, in LAW IN THE DOMAINS OF CULTURE 21 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 
1998). 
 53. See, e.g., MERRY, supra note 37, at 11-16; Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 
YALE L.J. 1399 (2003) (making the same point about religion). 
 54. See, e.g., RATNA KAPUR, Erotic Disruptions: Legal Narratives of Culture, Sex and 
Nation in India, in EROTIC JUSTICE: LAW AND THE NEW POLITICS OF POSTCOLONIALISM, supra 
note 46, at 51. 
 55. Lovelace v. Canada, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. R.6/24, U.N. 
Doc. A/36/40 (July 30, 1981). For an overview of the complex First Nations politics associated 
with the case, see John Borrows, Contemporary Traditional Equality: The Effect of the Charter 
on First Nation Politics, 43 U. NEW BRUNSWICK L.J. 19 (1994). 
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tween women’s equal rights and the group’s right to apply its traditional mem-
bership rules or to set the rules.56 Although “Indian” is actually the category 
used by the Indian Act, which originated in the colonial period, the Canadian 
government argued that the statutory definition reflected indigenous tradition. 
In addition to arguing that the Act discriminated on the basis of sex, Lovelace 
disputed the government’s contention about tradition.57 She maintained that the 
Maliseet were historically matrilineal, but that Maliseet men, at least, had come 
to believe that the Act’s patrilineal rules codified their own custom.58 That is, 
she made the post-essentialist point that what appeared to be indigenous tradi-
tion was, in fact, an invention of colonial bureaucrats. 
Lovelace may be read as exemplifying either a weaker or a stronger post-
essentialist critique. On the weaker critique, underneath the invented tradition 
lies the authentic tradition that was lost when the colonized absorbed the ver-
sion systematized, purveyed, and imposed by the colonizer. On the stronger 
post-essentialist critique, all culture is invented. If more were known about the 
earlier Maliseet matriarchal tradition, it would become apparent that it too was 
invented. 
Thus we should recognize that at any one time, insiders will have different 
interpretations of their culture. For instance, women might “reinterpret the 
meaning of arranged marriage and actively invert the power hierarchies asso-
ciated with customary families [by] . . . ‘agreeing to marry a partner chosen 
through family but [still] insisting on some autonomy.’”59 In such cases, British 
immigration judges have been criticized for concluding that the marriage was 
neither a “real” marriage (being arranged) nor a “real” arranged marriage (de-
viating from traditional interpretation of the custom).60 But if any account of a 
culture is contested or contestable, how can we mount a cultural claim at all 
without falling back into essentialism? 
One influential response has been Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s idea of 
strategic essentialism, which she developed in the context of postcolonial stu-
dies. Unlike much-criticized essentialism, strategic essentialism recognizes that 
the essential attributes of a group are socially constructed rather than natural. It 
 
 56. See, e.g., HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 223-24 (2000); Anne F. Bayefsky, The Human 
Rights Committee and the Case of Sandra Lovelace, 20 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 244 (1982); David S. 
Berry, Contextualising International Women’s Rights: Canadian Feminism, Race and Cul-
ture, in LEGAL FEMINISMS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 119, 125-27 (Clare McGlynn ed., 1998). 
 57. Lovelace, supra note 55, ¶ 6. 
 58. See KAREN KNOP, DIVERSITY AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
358-72 (2002). 
 59. Angelia K. Means, Intercultural Political Identity: Are We There Yet?, in 
MIGRATIONS AND MOBILITIES: CITIZENSHIP, BORDERS, AND GENDER, supra note 43, at 380, 
391 (second alteration in original) (quoting Susan Sterett, Intercultural Citizenship: Statuto-
ry Interpretation and Belonging in Britain, in CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES IN COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE 119, 121 (Sally J. Kenney et al. eds., 1999)). 
 60. See id. 
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refers to the deliberate choice to develop a general category or essentialized 
community, such as “indigenous,” for the purpose of achieving particular polit-
ical aims. According to Spivak, strategic essentialism is, in fact, a means to res-
ist essentialism. It empowers oppressed groups by giving them a way to define 
themselves and thus resist their definition by powerful others. This strategy is 
at once politically effective and deconstructive because it operates on the po-
tential—the group’s potential and logically any subgroup’s potential—to rede-
fine the essence of identity.61 Whereas lapsing into essentialism is a problem, 
deploying essentialism may be a valuable political intervention. Strategic es-
sentialism may be either radical or conservative, depending on “who is utilizing 
it, how it is deployed, and where its effects are concentrated.”62 
D. Responses to Post-Essentialist Critiques of Culture 
The anthropological insight that all culture is invented tradition has served 
to undercut the opposition of culture to equality in two principal ways. For 
some feminists, whom we might call transformationists, it suggests that culture 
need not be the enemy of women’s equal rights. As Sally Engle Merry puts it, 
“Seeing culture as open to change emphasizes struggles over cultural values 
within local communities and encourages attention to local cultural practices as 
resources for change.”63 There is room to transform a given culture while still 
paying respect to culture as a concept. For others, who can be loosely grouped 
together as minimizers, the recognition that all cultural claims rest on a contest-
able account of the culture in question—an account which has often become 
authoritative because of powerful (male) elites—is a reason to dispense with, or 
at least minimize, the role of culture.64 
 
 61. See Criticism, Feminism and the Institution: An Interview with Gayatri Chakra-
vorty Spivak, THESIS ELEVEN, Feb. 1985, at 175, 183-84. Spivak has since distanced herself 
from this notion. See, e.g., Sara Danius & Stefan Jonsson, An Interview with Gayatri Cha-
kravorty Spivak, BOUNDARY 2, Summer 1993, at 24, 34-36. On strategic essentialism and 
related ideas, see Lara Karaian, The Troubled Relationship of Feminist and Queer Legal 
Theory to Strategic Essentialism: Theory/Praxis, Queer Porn, and Canadian Anti-
Discrimination Law, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY: INTIMATE ENCOUNTERS, 
UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATIONS 375, 378-79 (Martha Albertson Fineman et al. eds., 
2009). 
 62. DIANA FUSS, ESSENTIALLY SPEAKING: FEMINISM, NATURE & DIFFERENCE 20 
(1989). 
 63. MERRY, supra note 37, at 9. 
 64. See generally KAMALA VISWESWARAN, UN/COMMON CULTURES: RACISM AND THE 
REARTICULATION OF CULTURAL DIFFERENCE (2010) (critiquing the traditional anthropologi-
cal concept of culture for essentializing cultural identity and therefore precluding dialogue). 
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1. Transforming cultures 
The idea of transforming cultures as a way to reconcile respect for the con-
cept with a commitment to gender equality has influenced the thinking of fe-
minist legal academics in various ways. Three serve here as representative. In a 
first transformationist mode, the recognition that culture is invented has led fe-
minists to look for the inventors. As in the Lovelace scenario, feminist mem-
bers of the community seek and advance alternative interpretations of their cul-
ture which may have been suppressed historically by the colonizer, the 
community’s political leadership, or its cultural elites in favor of a patriarchal 
interpretation.65 Feminists thus counter one cultural claim with another—but 
theirs is an act of strategic self-definition as against those who would oppress 
women by defining them. It is Spivak-style strategic essentialism rather than 
simple essentialism. 
Yet in seeing women in other cultures as engaged in strategic essentialism, 
we again encounter the challenge of understanding the “other.” Legal feminists 
in the West tend to assume that women will practice strategic essentialism in 
order to advance a more egalitarian version of their culture, whereas anthropol-
ogist Saba Mahmood describes women in Egypt who wear the veil not as a 
“manipulable mask[] in a game of public presentation,” but in order to help cul-
tivate a form of pious “shyness.”66 The “desires, motivations, commitments, 
and aspirations of the people to whom these practices are important,” she ar-
gues, must be considered when evaluating claims of essentialism.67 
The fluidity of culture also grounds a second set of proposals for transfor-
mative transcultural dialogue;68 that is, alliances with feminist dissenters inside 
a particular culture.69 If the dominant patriarchal account of that culture is so-
cially constructed or up for argument, then intervention on the side of an alter-
 
 65. See, e.g., Lata Mani, Contentious Traditions: The Debate on Sati in Colonial In-
dia, in RECASTING WOMEN: ESSAYS IN COLONIAL HISTORY 88 (Kumkum Sangari & Sudesh 
Vaid eds., 1989); see also Valentine M. Moghadam, Global Feminism, Citizenship, and the 
State: Negotiating Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa, in MIGRATIONS AND 
MOBILITIES: CITIZENSHIP, BORDERS, AND GENDER, supra note 43, at 255, 269 (“The Moroc-
can case is a striking example of how women’s rights advocates can build coalitions to gen-
erate social dialogues, have an impact on key policy debates, and help effect legal reform 
and public policy changes.”). 
 66. Mahmood, supra note 46, at 214. 
 67. Id. at 225; see also SABA MAHMOOD, POLITICS OF PIETY: THE ISLAMIC REVIVAL 
AND THE FEMINIST SUBJECT (2005). 
 68. Cf. supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text. 
 69. See, e.g., HOLTMAAT & NABER, supra note 33, at 106-07; Karima Bennoune, Re-
membering the Other’s Others: Theorizing the Approach of International Law to Muslim 
Fundamentalism, 41 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 635, 686-89, 691 (2010); Madhavi Sunder, 
Enlightened Constitutionalism, 37 CONN. L. REV. 891, 901-02 (2005). For the argument that 
this strategy of “splitting and seduction” has colonial echoes, which is not to condemn it per 
se, see Nathaniel Berman, “The Appeals of the Orient”: Colonized Desire and the War of 
the Riff, in GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS 195, 206-08 (Karen Knop ed., 2004). 
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native, more egalitarian account, it seems to be implied, is not interfering with 
authenticity or imposing outside values.70  
Similarly, if all cultures “innovate, appropriate, and create local practic-
es,”71 then meshing arguments about women’s international human rights with 
strategic essentialist arguments cannot be objected to simply because it may in-
troduce outside influences. Merry’s multi-sited ethnographic account of how 
international human rights norms on violence against women interact with local 
culture recommends a process of “vernacularizing” women’s human rights. 
Their universality is preserved by translating them into familiar cultural terms 
(which makes them less disturbing to local elites and therefore easier to adopt) 
while retaining the human rights framework (which makes them more trans-
formative).72 Merry’s work implicitly highlights both the limits of translation 
as a way to overcome the earlier cultural relativism critique, and the limits of 
strategic essentialism as a way to overcome the post-essentialist critique. 
Critics caution that transformationists can lose sight of the well-entrenched 
institutional forms that culture takes. In debates about whether Western multi-
cultural democracies should recognize Islamic faith-based arbitration of family 
and inheritance matters, for instance, some opponents argue that although pro-
gressive interpretations of Islamic law are possible in theory, historical and 
modern precedents point to the strong likelihood that Islamic law would be in-
terpreted and applied in ways that would be more patriarchal and damaging to 
women than the state’s law.73  
Accordingly, a third transformationist strategy seeks to restructure the 
overarching rules so as to shift incentive structures within the group and there-
by empower the internal dissenters (whatever the grounds of their claims, cul-
tural or egalitarian). One such example is Madhavi Sunder’s three-part proce-
dural prescription. First, Sunder argues that instead of privileging the norms of 
cultural elites, as they now do, international and national legal decisionmakers 
should “place elites and dissenters on an equal footing” when a dispute is 
brought to them.74 Second, the state should ensure that marginalized voices are 
able to participate in the processes of creating cultural meaning.75 Third, legal 
 
 70. There are also, of course, arguments for intervention qua intervention. See Sunder, 
supra note 53. 
 71. MERRY, supra note 37, at 228. 
 72. See id. at 222; see also SIOBHÁN MULLALLY, GENDER, CULTURE AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS: RECLAIMING UNIVERSALISM (2006). 
 73. Macklin, supra note 43, at 287; see also David Jacobson, Multiculturalism, Gend-
er, and Rights, in MIGRATIONS AND MOBILITIES: CITIZENSHIP, BORDERS, AND GENDER, supra 
note 43, at 304, 322. 
 74. Sunder, supra note 53, at 1466-67; see also Linda C. McClain, Negotiating Gender 
and (Free and Equal) Citizenship: The Place of Associations, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1569, 
1595-97 (2004). 
 75. Sunder, supra note 53, at 1468. 
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decisionmakers should ultimately choose among the competing accounts of a 
culture on a substantive basis, rejecting discriminatory accounts.76 
Ayelet Shachar’s idea of “transformative accommodation” is another ex-
ample of a transformative approach attentive to incentive structures.77 On her 
model for multicultural states, the authority to decide matters critical for a mi-
nority’s self-definition would be divided between the minority and the state, 
creating a form of joint governance similar to those found in federal systems. 
Neither jurisdiction would have a monopoly over these matters, neither could 
trump the other, and choice options would be clearly delineated. Shachar’s de-
sign tolerates discriminatory internal restrictions on the theory that its features 
will “alleviate, or at least significantly mitigate, the paradox of multicultural 
vulnerability by equipping members with means of combating unjust internal 
restrictions,” while also working “to preserve and even enhance the accommo-
dation of group traditions through state-backed external protections.”78 We 
might think of her model as a compromise in that it aims at equality in all mat-
ters, but takes the chance that the incentive structure it proposes may not deliv-
er this result for the matters within the minority’s jurisdiction. 
2. Minimizing culture 
The other group of feminist responses to the post-essentialist idea of cul-
ture is less inclined toward a role for culture. One line of this response is to re-
place or minimize culture as a frame. Authors following this line are wary of 
strategic essentialism as a resource for women, emphasizing that regardless of 
which insider account of a culture is authorized, any account proceeds by ex-
cluding some other insider account, most often the account of those still further 
subjugated.79 Ratna Kapur, for example, proposes that cultural claims be re-
framed; specifically, she advocates that sexual practices in India be evaluated 
not in terms of their cultural authenticity, but rather in terms of erotic desire 
and exclusion.80 In response, Maneesha Deckha notes that proposals such as 
Kapur’s offer a practical alternative only when such reframing is possible, 
whether in terms of sexuality, justice, pain, or other concepts. “Eliminating cul-
tural claims at this historical moment would leave many vulnerable groups 
without any legal tool to guard against cultural disintegration, extinction, or ex-
ploitation. . . . [S]ome essentialism in cultural claims must be tolerated. It will 
 
 76. Id. at 1469. 
 77. See AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES 
AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS 14 (2001). 
 78. Id. 
 79. See KAPUR, supra note 54, at 88-90; Maneesha Deckha, Is Culture Taboo? Femin-
ism, Intersectionality, and Culture Talk in Law, 16 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 14, 35-36 (2004); 
Volpp, supra note 41, at 98-99. 
 80. KAPUR, supra note 54, at 90-93.  
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be a trade-off of potentially essentializing means for egalitarian ends.”81 In the 
context of immigrant women and the so-called cultural defense in criminal law, 
Leti Volpp formulates a modified strategic essentialism, in which cultural in-
formation going to an immigrant defendant’s state of mind would only be al-
lowed if this was consistent with the principle of antisubordination.82 Cultural 
information would be permitted in the case of an Asian woman seeking to ex-
plain her mental state when she attempted to commit parent-child suicide, for 
instance, but not in the case of an Asian man seeking a cultural defense for his 
violence against an Asian woman.83 In a similar vein, Deckha accepts the stra-
tegic use of cultural essentialism as a last resort provided that the cultural claim 
does not subordinate women or others within the cultural minority by impairing 
their autonomy or equality. She also accepts that such claims might privilege 
the interests of some vulnerable members and not others, so long as they meet 
this antisubordination condition.84 In contrast to anthropologists like Mah-
mood, who seek to offer accounts of feminist insiders using strategically essen-
tialist accounts of their culture as a tool of empowerment, legal academics like 
Kapur, Volpp, and Deckha are primarily interested in making non-essentialist 
or essentialist claims for a purpose and only secondarily as a description of how 
things are. Thus, they turn anthropological accounts of cultural tools into legal 
tools of their own.85 
As distinct from discarding or limiting culture as a frame, another line of 
culture-minimizing response by feminists foregrounds choice. In her proposal 
for what she calls “multiculturalism without culture,” Anne Phillips dispenses 
with an essentialist understanding of culture and offers “[a] defensible multicul-
turalism [that] will put human agency much more at its centre.”86 A concrete 
example might be the 2004 report commissioned by the government of the Ca-
nadian province of Ontario as a result of public concern about the use of Mus-
lim personal law to arbitrate family and inheritance issues. Intended to examine 
the impact of arbitration on vulnerable people, including women, the report 
recommended that enforceable faith-based arbitration continue to be available 
 
 81. Deckha, supra note 79, at 38.  
 82. Volpp, supra note 41, at 91, 95, 97-100. 
 83. Id. at 59-60, 97-100; see also Leti Volpp, Talking “Culture”: Gender, Race, Na-
tion, and the Politics of Multiculturalism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1573, 1585, 1594-96 (1996). 
 84. Deckha, supra note 79, at 52.  
 85. Cf. Annelise Riles, Anthropology, Human Rights, and Legal Knowledge: Culture 
in the Iron Cage, 108 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 52, 62 (2006). 
 86. PHILLIPS, supra note 6, at 9. For yet another perspective, see DAVINA COOPER, 
CHALLENGING DIVERSITY: RETHINKING EQUALITY AND THE VALUE OF DIFFERENCE 74-78, 
192-94 (2004) (arguing for “recentr[ing] social inequality, rather than cultural harm, as di-
versity’s problematic” and emphasizing equality of power as distinct from equality of re-
sources, on the one hand, and equality of recognition, on the other). 
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under the province’s Arbitration Act, but also recommended specific procedur-
al safeguards to ensure that the parties gave their informed consent.87 
 
*   *   * 
 
Can the concept of culture be deployed without falling back into essential-
ism? To take the post-essentialist critique as license to transform a culture is to 
hollow out the concept of culture itself. Then again, to discard culture for this 
reason is logically to discard any claim based on group attributes—the category 
of “women” is likewise socially constructed. In short, changing conceptions of 
culture have made it more difficult for feminists to keep their bearings in the 
feminism/culture debate. The normative clarity of those who frame the conflict 
as equality versus culture is met with layer upon layer of cultural complication. 
In turn, this nuanced cultural analysis is confronted with the normative hard 
choice. Indeed, even the most sophisticated exchanges often end on a note of 
critique or complexity.88 
II. A HYPOTHETICAL CASE 
In this Part, we shift gears and explore what a concrete feminism/culture 
conflict looks like in all its private law detail. Given the broad theoretical direc-
tion of the discussion to this point, the reader may experience something of a 
shock of disconnect, followed perhaps by a sense of skepticism. But this is pre-
cisely the point. At first glance, our example may seem to have nothing to do 
with the debates surveyed above. It does not concern any of the usual sus-
pects—veils, polygamous marriages, disparaged sexual identities, and the like. 
In fact, the parties themselves would be unlikely to frame the conflict as a prob-
lem of either gender or culture. And yet on closer analysis, our example proves 
not only to have both feminist and cultural dimensions, but to be more diz-
zyingly postmodern and more complex in its postcolonial dimensions and en-
tanglements with global capitalism than even the edgiest feminist theories 
might imagine. 
 
 87. MARION BOYD, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW: PROTECTING CHOICE, 
PROMOTING INCLUSION 5, 133-37 (2004), available at http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov 
.on.ca/english/about/pubs/boyd/fullreport.pdf. The report’s recommendations were not im-
plemented. See Ontario Premier Rejects Use of Sharia Law, CBC NEWS (Sept. 11, 2005, 
5:19 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2005/09/09/sharia-protests-20050909.html. 
 88. See, for example, Roger Cotterrell, The Struggle for Law: Some Dilemmas of Cul-
tural Legality, 4 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 373 (2009), and the responses by Mezey, supra note 43; 
John Mikhail, Dilemmas of Cultural Legality: A Comment on Roger Cotterrell’s “The 
Struggle for Law” and a Criticism of the House of Lords’ Opinions in Begum, 4 INT’L J.L. 
CONTEXT 385 (2009); and Robin West, Comments on Roger Cotterrell’s Essay, “The Strug-
gle for Law: Some Dilemmas of Cultural Legality,” 4 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 401 (2009). 
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A. A Dispute over a Gift 
Consider the following case, based on actual litigation but hypothetical in 
its details:89 a conflict between a father and a daughter over the meaning of a 
gift. The father, Toru, is a citizen and domiciliary of Japan, while his daughter, 
Yoshiko, is a Japanese citizen now domiciled in California. The gift at issue 
comprises all the shares of a corporation, the California subsidiary of a Japa-
nese natural health foods products company founded by Toru. Toru is the 
chairman of the board, principal shareholder, and CEO of the Japanese parent 
company. The California subsidiary manufactures the products for the Ameri-
can market at a factory in California. 
The gift document was drafted by a lawyer in California in both English 
and Japanese versions, signed by Toru in Japan and countersigned by Yoshiko 
in California. After the documentation was signed, the company registry was 
amended to show Yoshiko as the owner of the shares. A year later, Toru had 
his daughter execute a proxy giving him the right to vote the shares for the 
maximum statutory period for which proxies are valid in California, eleven 
months. Although the proxy was never renewed, Toru continued to make all 
significant company decisions for several years after its expiration. 
Yoshiko’s story is this: her father fully transferred control of the company 
to her, but he continues to try to interfere in its internal affairs and arrogantly 
second-guesses her every business decision. When the company recently lost 
its primary customer, accounting for seventy-five percent of its business, Yo-
shiko sold some unused real estate in order to generate cash for operating ex-
penses. This infuriated her father, who is instead pushing for a merger with 
another company, owned by one of his business associates, something she op-
poses. Yoshiko is contemplating raising funds through various means (borrow-
ing money or issuing stock) but first her investment bank needs clarity about 
her rights in the existing company stock. 
Toru’s story is this: several years ago, in anticipation of his own death or 
eventual inability to head the company, he began to worry about succession 
struggles between his son (who lives in Japan and works at the company head-
quarters) and his daughter. He was also advised that it would be more advanta-
geous from a tax perspective to transfer shares now rather than to leave them to 
his daughter in his will. His solution was to give Yoshiko the shares of the 
American subsidiary “in name only” (meigi) but to retain control over the com-
pany, with the view that eventually his son would own and run the parent com-
pany while Yoshiko would own and run the smaller American subsidiary. He 
claims (although she denies) that he clearly communicated his intent to retain 
 
 89. One of the authors (Riles) served as an expert witness in the litigation. See Hagi-
wara v. Amano, No. CIV217048 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 23, 2003). This case settled be-
fore a decision was reached, and the parties did not raise the conflict of laws issues we raise 
here.  
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control at the time he executed the gift documentation. Toru now maintains that 
the gift of the shares “in name only” was simply a way of signaling his future 
intent, and that the gift did not actually transfer control of the subsidiary (al-
though he explicitly stated in both the English and Japanese versions that he 
was making a “gift”). He brings suit against Yoshiko in California state court, 
asking the court to declare him the beneficial owner of the subsidiary. 
B. The Substantive Law Dimensions 
From the perspective of California law, Toru faces an uphill battle. In prin-
ciple, a valid gift of shares confers on the donee all rights of control and aliena-
tion. This standard legal rule reflects a much broader baseline assumption with-
in the culture that “a gift is a gift.” “Indian gifts” and “Indian givers”—in the 
problematic phrase for those who take back what they give—are frowned upon 
in both law and practice.90 The problem is not that what Toru might have had 
in mind—namely, to transfer title to the shares to his daughter while retaining 
effective control for himself—would be impossible. The problem, rather, is that 
the particular form that he chose to effectuate his wishes is incompatible with 
California law. 
One path for Toru lies in corporate law. Ordinarily, voting rights are inse-
parable from title in stock. California corporate law does not recognize transfer 
of shares “in name only.” It does allow, however, for agreed restrictions on 
their control.91 For example, if Toru’s aim was to prevent Yoshiko from selling 
the company, the shares transferred to her could have been made subject to a 
restriction on transfer. To be effective, such an explicit restriction on transfer 
would have had to be noted on the shares themselves, so that third parties are 
not misled.92 Likewise, a voting agreement would have obliged Yoshiko to 
vote her shares as Toru directed, though breach of such an agreement would be 
actionable only as between the parties. The parties could also have renewed 
their proxy agreement when it expired.93 
Trust law offers another possible way to account for the intimate relations 
between these economic actors and for Toru’s intention to separate ownership 
and control. Toru might have made his gift in the form of a trust, whereby the 
transferee acquires legal title whereas the transferor, as beneficiary, retains ef-
 
 90. See Jonathan Parry, The Gift, the Indian Gift, and the “Indian Gift,” 21 MAN (n.s.) 
453, 461 (1986). 
 91. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 702(c) (West 2012). 
 92. See id. § 418(b). 
 93. See id. § 706. Section 7.31(a) of the Model Business Corporation Act likewise 
provides that “[t]wo or more shareholders may provide for the manner in which they will 
vote their shares by signing an agreement for that purpose.” MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT 
§ 7.31(a) (2006). 
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fective control over the stock.94 An express trust obligating Yoshiko to act as a 
fiduciary for her father would not require an explicit writing as long as the in-
tention to create a trust was ascertainable.95 But again, Toru did not comply 
with these requirements. Toru might argue that the fact that Yoshiko effectively 
followed Toru’s wishes in voting for a lengthy period after the transfer is evi-
dence of the existence of an implied trust, but Yoshiko might reply that she 
complied with her father’s wishes for a period of time not out of any legal obli-
gation but simply in order to avoid conflict within the family and to do what 
seemed right. 
A third lens for thinking about the case might be the law of gifts.96 Like 
corporate law, the law of gifts requires that the parties adhere to well-defined 
formalities or the gift will fail.97 According to the common law of gifts in most 
U.S. jurisdictions, including California, a gift requires both an intent to give 
and delivery—complete divestment by the donor of the property.98 If the inten-
tion is to make a transfer in the future (at death, for example), the gift is not va-
lid.99 Toru thus might argue that he lacked the requisite intent100 to make a gift, 
 
 94. Japanese corporate law recognizes trusts, but the trust form remains unattractive 
for most parties. See Hideki Kanda, Politics, Formalism, and the Elusive Goal of Investor 
Protection: Regulation of Structured Investment Funds in Japan, 12 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 
569, 571-72 (1991). For a brief introduction into Japanese trust law, see Hiroto Dogauchi, 
Overview of Trust Law in Japan, SCH. L. TOHOKU U., http://www.law.tohoku.ac.jp/          
kokusaiB2C/link/dogauchi.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). See also Arthur Nussbaum, So-
ciological and Comparative Aspects of the Trust, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 408, 423, 429-30 
(1938). 
 95. See Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. Long Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass’n, 297 P.2d 443, 447 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956). 
 96. In the common law of most U.S. states, a gift is commonly defined as a voluntary 
transfer of property by one to another without consideration. See, e.g., Heritage Bank Tinley 
Park v. Steinberg (In re Grabill Corp.), 121 B.R. 983, 997 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990). Under 
California law, a valid gift must meet the following requirements: (1) competency of the do-
nor to contract; (2) a voluntary intent on the part of the donor to make a gift; (3) delivery, 
either actual or symbolic; (4) acceptance, actual or imputed; (5) complete divestment of all 
control by the donor; and (6) lack of consideration for the gift. See, e.g., Lynch v. Lynch, 12 
P.2d 741, 742 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1932). 
 97. See, e.g., Wood v. Stephens, No. B151997, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9070, 
at *8-17 (Sept. 27, 2002).  
 98. See Pashley v. Pashley (In re Marriage of Pashley), 115 Cal. Rptr. 537, 539 (Ct. 
App. 1974); see also United States v. Alcaraz-Garcia, 79 F.3d 769, 775 (9th Cir. 1996); Me-
hren v. Dargan (In re Marriage of Mehren), 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 522, 525 (Ct. App. 2004); Ga-
retson v. Garetson, No. A100080, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1464, at *14-15 (Feb. 18, 
2004); Rolinson v. Rolinson, 282 P.2d 98, 100 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955); 13 B.E. WITKIN, 
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 128 (10th ed. 2005). 
 99. See Crocker v. Hall (In re Hall’s Estate), 98 P. 269, 271-72 (Cal. 1908). 
100. Under California law, “[i]t is the intent with which the delivery is made which is 
the primary essential, for unless the donor intends to divest itself completely of control and 
dominion over the property, the gift is incomplete.” Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 362, 375 (Ct. App. 1999); see also Burkle v. Burkle, 46 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 562, 567 & n.5 (Ct. App. 2006); Berl v. Rosenberg, 336 P.2d 975, 979 (Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1959); Blonde v. Estate of Jenkins, 281 P.2d 14, 16 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955). 
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since his goal was only to signal his intention for succession in the future. 
However, a donor’s private, undisclosed reservations alone will not be enough 
to contradict other objective evidence of valid intent.101 The document with 
which the shares were transferred clearly characterizes the transfer as a “gift,” 
and Toru would in effect need to ask for an exception to the parol evidence rule 
to prove that he intended something different. He might also argue that he did 
not relinquish control—and hence did not divest himself of the property if, in 
the logic of the corporate law, ownership of shares and voting rights are inse-
parable. However, the parties allowed Toru’s proxy to expire without renewing 
it. 
C. The Cultural Dimensions 
1. The culture of household—corporation and kinship 
Toru’s assertion that the transfer was “in name only” might seem like a 
mere mistake or a flight of ignorance about (California) law. Yet what Califor-
nia law treats as a mistake is in fact the reflection of specific Japanese cultural 
practices and ideas that frame two key social institutions—the corporation and 
the kinship relation. 
It is not surprising, then, that Toru’s view of things finds considerable sup-
port in Japanese law. The heads of Japanese family-owned companies com-
monly transfer shares to designated successors of their companies as a means of 
avoiding disputes among siblings over control of a family-owned company at 
the time of the death of the company head. Frequently this is done “in name on-
ly,” and there is considerable precedent in the case law for the concept of 
“name-only” shareholdings.102 In these cases, courts have found that in family-
 
101. Frapwell v. Gillespie (In re Marriage of Frapwell), 122 Cal. Rptr. 718, 720 (Ct. 
App. 1975). 
102. In Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 17, 1967, Sho 42 (o) no. 231, 21 SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 2448, the chairman of a dōzoku gaisha, see infra note 
117, issued new shares in the company and distributed them to certain employees in order to 
add legitimacy to the company. The company head explained to the employees that the 
transfer would be in name only, and that they would be paid a special bonus in consideration 
for their participation in the scheme. Later one of the employees demanded that he receive 
the shares registered in his name. The district court ruled for the company and its decision 
was upheld on appeal. The high court (the regional appellate court) reasoned that where 
shares are transferred in name only, and where the transferee approves the use of his name in 
this way, ownership rights are retained by the party that borrows the transferee’s name. The 
Japanese Supreme Court upheld the high court’s decision on the same reasoning. See Komo-
to Ichiro, Tanin no shōdaku no motonisono meigi o mochiite kabushiki no hikiukeganasareta 
baai ni okeru kabunushi [Ownership of Shares Registered in Another Party’s Name with 
That Party’s Approval], 59 MINSHŌHŌ ZASHI 57 (1968). In 1975, the Supreme Court again 
reaffirmed this decision in Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 14, 1975, Sho 50 (o) no. 438, 
116 MINSHŪ 475. See SUGAWARA KIKUSHI, HANREI SHŌHŌ [COMMERCIAL CODE PRECEDENT] 
225 (1993). More recently, a decision of the Nagoya High Court again affirmed that actual 
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owned companies, transfers of shares are tantamount to wills: ways of express-
ing intent about what should happen at the transferor’s passing. Hence they are 
transfers “in name only” and do not confer on the transferee rights to control. 
Thus, in practice, so-called “name-only” shareholders and “name-only” direc-
tors do not have the rights or duties of actual shareholders or directors. Moreo-
ver, courts confronted with disputes over transfers of shares in family-owned 
companies among family members most often resolve those disputes in a way 
that will give effect to the intention of the head of the company or prevent the 
fragmentation of the shareholdings.103 This is true even when the actions of 
company heads explicitly violate the letter of the company law.104 Article 
201(1) of the Commercial Code, moreover, anticipates that share transfers may 
take place on the books without the knowledge of transferees and provides that 
in such cases, it is the actual shareholder, and not the nominal shareholder, who 
has control of the company.105 
Often family-owned companies also transfer shares or install directors to 
the board of directors “in name only.” In addition to the above, such registra-
tion of nominal shareholders is done in order to satisfy the requirements of the 
commercial law for incorporation, to give the company greater legitimacy on 
paper, or to provide some form of symbolic recognition to non-family members 
who have made substantial contributions to a family-owned company (such as 
lifelong managers).106 It is commonly understood that the purpose of transfers 
by a company head to his children is to plan for succession in the future, at the 
time of the head’s death, and not to transfer control of the company in the 
present. In fact, it is not unusual for the designated successor to remain una-
 
shareholders, not those shareholders formally listed on the registry, retain legal control. Na-
goya Kōtō Saibansho [Nagoya High Ct.] April 24, 1991, Hei 2 (ne) no. 206, KŌTŌ 
SAIBANSHO HANREISHŪ [SAIBANREI JŌHŌ] 1, http://www.courts.go.jp. 
103. See Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 9, 1972, Sho 43 (o) no. 232, 105 MINSHŪ 269; 
see also Fukuoka Kōtō Saibansho [Fukuoka High Ct.] Oct. 31, 2002, Hei 14 (ne) no. 236, 
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ 1, http://www.courts.go.jp. 
104. See, e.g., Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Sept. 17, 1997, 1640 HANREI 
JIHŌ [HANJI] 160. 
105. The Japanese Commercial Code reads as follows: 
A person who has taken shares using the name of a fictitious person shall incur the lia-
bility of a person taking shares. The same shall apply to a person who has taken shares in the 
name of other person [sic] without his consent.  
SHŌHŌ [SHŌHŌ] [COMM. C.] art. 201(1), translated in 2 EHS LAW BULL. SER. no. 2200, at 54 
(2005). Book II of the Commercial Code, in which this paragraph appears, was abolished 
when the Companies Act came into effect in 2006. See Kaishahō [Companies Act], Law No. 
86 of 2005 (Hōrei teikyō dēta shisutemu [Hōrei DB]), http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgi      -
bin/idxsearch.cgi (stating the rules of incorporation). However, the rule discussed here re-
mains good law based on an analogy to Article 117(1) of the Civil Code, MINPŌ [MINPŌ] 
[CIV. C.] art. 117(1). See EGASHIRA KENJIRŌ, KABUSHIKI-GAISHAHŌ [LAWS OF STOCK 
CORPORATIONS] 94 (3d ed. 2009). 
106. See, e.g., Komoto Ichiro, supra note 102 (discussing a case in which shares were 
issued “in name only” to add legitimacy to the company). 
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ware that the transfer has taken place until after the death of the company 
head.107 
Thus, the kinship relationship between Toru and Yoshiko is obviously cen-
tral to their dispute. To understand their actions, we need to understand not on-
ly something about corporations in Japan, but something about the traditional 
nature and economic activities of the Japanese household, the ie (literally 
“house”). Unlike the common American conception of a family, an ie is a unit 
engaged in a particular kind of business, often over generations (in theory at 
least it should last in perpetuity, and many Japanese ie in fact do trace their li-
neage and their business back several centuries).108 Prior to U.S. occupation-
era legal reforms,109 the ie legally owned all assets collectively, as its own form 
of legal personhood, and to this day household members extensively share as-
sets that are nominally owned individually.  
In contrast to the traditional middle-class Euro-American nuclear family 
form of two sexually intimate individuals living together with their genetic 
offspring, the Japanese ie has traditionally consisted of two political/economic 
leadership “positions” or “offices”—the office of the clan head, and his 
spouse/partner. The office of the clan head has traditionally brought with it au-
thority over the family enterprise and control over its affairs as well as respon-
sibility for managing those affairs.110 Only one person can hold this office at 
one time, and therefore only one child in each generation can succeed to the of-
fice of clan head. Hence, succession is always a crucial but contestable matter 
within the ie.111 The presumption traditionally has been that the clan head’s 
oldest son succeeds his father in this position at his death.112 In practice, how-
ever, this rule of primogeniture is less important than the economic well-being 
and survival of the ie. A clan head may choose as successor a second son who 
seems more equipped to run the family business than his older brother; he may 
 
107. Article 201(1) of the Japanese Commercial Code clearly anticipates that share 
transfers may take place on the books without the knowledge of transferees, and that in such 
cases it is the actual shareholder, and not the nominal shareholder, who has control of the 
company and therefore should be held liable for its actions. See supra note 105. 
108. See Jane M. Bachnik, Recruitment Strategies for Household Succession: Rethink-
ing Japanese Household Organization, 18 MAN (n.s.) 160, 160-61(1983); cf. Shunji Sakai, 
Communication et cohésion sociale dans les organisations japonaises [Communication and 
Social Cohesion in Japanese Organizations], 38 SOCIÉTÉ 367, 371 (1992). 
109. On the U.S. occupation of Japan after World War II, see note 125 below. 
110. See Bachnik, supra note 108, at 161. 
111. Anthropologist Jane Bachnik describes the ie as “constantly ‘sorting’ between 
temporary and permanent members”—between the ones who will succeed to the company 
and the ones who will be forced out. Id. at 176. 
112.  Those who do not succeed to the office of clan head must set out on their own, or 
are sent out to found “branches” of the ie (with economic support of their root ie). See 
MATTHEWS MASAYUKI HAMABATA, CRESTED KIMONO: POWER AND LOVE IN THE JAPANESE 
BUSINESS FAMILY 33 (1990). Typically this branch is engaged in some sort of economic ac-
tivity that is related but subsidiary to the work of the root ie, such as the production of a 
component part of the final product produced by the root ie. 
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allow a daughter to assume control; he may bring in an outsider whose man-
agement skills he admires, by marrying him to a daughter;113 or he may adopt a 
manager, in adulthood, as his “eldest son.”114 Therefore, although ie is often 
translated as “household,” “family,” or “clan,”115 the ie is perhaps better un-
derstood as the Japanese analogue to the Euro-American corporation. Like the 
corporation, the ie is a pool of wealth that exists in perpetuity with a unified 
management structure that is nevertheless advised by others.116 
This unique kinship relationship sometimes takes the form of an actual 
corporate enterprise. The dōzoku gaisha (literally “lineage company”)117 is a 
uniquely Japanese institution.118 Despite its formal legal existence as a corpora-
tion like any other, in the eyes of most Japanese, its corporate identity is a tech-
nical legal overlay on a very old and established social institution. The “lineage 
company” is more lineage than company.119 The particular features of these 
companies have contributed fundamentally to the economic success of Japan in 
the postwar era. For example, the practice of “relational contracting” among 
branch family companies engaged in a chain of production, in which each link 
in the chain is willing to make sacrifices in its dealings with other links for the 
sake of the long-term stability of relations among units, results in low transac-
tion costs and a high degree of economic efficiency of the kind that can only be 
 
113. When this occurs, the daughter traditionally keeps the household name and inherits 
its assets. Id. at 45. 
114. There is extensive discussion of this practice in the anthropological literature. See, 
e.g., CHIE NAKANE, KINSHIP AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION IN RURAL JAPAN (1967); Bach-
nik, supra note 108; Harumi Befu, Corporate Emphasis and Patterns of Descent in the Jap-
anese Family, in JAPANESE CULTURE: ITS DEVELOPMENT AND CHARACTERISTICS 34 (Robert J. 
Smith & Richard K. Beardsley eds., 1962); Keith Brown, Dōzoku and the Ideology of Des-
cent in Rural Japan, 68 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 1129 (1966); Ichiro Kato, The Adoption of 
Majors in Japan, in AN AGING WORLD: DILEMMAS AND CHALLENGES FOR LAW AND SOCIAL 
POLICY 161 (John M. Eekelaar & David Pearl eds., 1989); Howard Wimberley, On Living 
With Your Past: Style and Structure Among Contemporary Japanese Merchant Families, 21 
ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 423 (1973).  
115. See Hironobu Kitaoji, The Structure of the Japanese Family, 73 AM. 
ANTHROPOLOGIST 1036, 1036 (1971). 
116. Cf. Teemu Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative 
Law and Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1599 (2000) (de-
scribing a similar phenomenon in Chinese kinship). 
117. A dōzoku gaisha is defined by the corporate tax code as a company in which more 
than fifty percent of the company’s shares are owned by no more than three shareholders and 
their relatives, their “personal employees” (shionin) and their immediate families, and other 
members of the households of the above. Hōjinzeihō [Corporate Taxation Act], Law No. 34 
of 1965, art. 2, para. 10 (Hōrei DB), http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi; cf. Kitano 
Hirohisa, Dōzoku gaisha, 1069 SHŌJI HŌMU 39, 39 (1986). More commonly, the term is used 
to mean an enterprise owned in substantial part by a Japanese clan, or ie. 
118. As the sociologist Catherine Silver points out, Japan’s successful modernization 
has not meant the Westernization of values. See Catherine B. Silver, Japanese and American 
Identities: Values and Their Transmission in the Family, 72 SOC. INQUIRY 195, 195 (2002). 
119. See DORINNE K. KONDO, CRAFTING SELVES: POWER, GENDER AND DISCOURSES OF 
IDENTITY IN A JAPANESE WORKPLACE 167-68 (1990). 
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achieved in Euro-American economies through very large economies of 
scale.120 Such small and medium-sized companies make up the overwhelming 
majority of all enterprises in Japan (99.7%).121 The vast majority of Japanese 
employees (70.2%) also work for one of them.122 To say that these “compa-
nies” are “really” families in legal disguise therefore risks further confusion if 
we have in mind a Euro-American conception of the family as a private sphere, 
defined by relations of affection and set apart from the rough-and-tumble of 
economic life. In point of fact, the Japanese household is already much more 
like a business entity than a “family” in Euro-American conceptions of that 
term. 
Likewise, focusing solely on whether Toru’s state of mind conforms to 
what the common law defines as “intent” to make a gift, or whether or not 
transferring shares but continuing to exercise a degree of control constitutes 
“delivery,” asks the decisionmaker to enter a make-believe world in which the 
context of the parties’ relationships and the lenses through which they made 
those choices simply do not exist.123 As Carol Rose argues, formal require-
ments reflect a wider cultural suspicion of gifts, a sense that rational people do 
not intend to give things away for nothing in return, and a view that many gifts 
are in fact the result of “theft” or “trickery” rather than freely given.124 We rely 
 
120. See Ronald Dore, Goodwill and the Spirit of Market Capitalism, 34 BRIT. J. SOC. 
459 (1983). 
121. Share of SMEs in the Japanese Economy, SMALL & MEDIUM ENTERPRISE AGENCY, 
http://www.chusho.meti.go.jp/sme_english/outline/07/01.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2012); see 
also Ministry of Internal Affairs & Commc’ns, Establishment and Enterprise Census, 
STATISTICS BUREAU (2008), http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/ListE.do?bid=000001008301 
&cycode=0 (follow “Excel” hyperlinks adjacent to “Table No. 10”); Chusho kigyo kankei no 
toikei shiryo [Statistical Data for Small and Medium-sized Companies], SMALL & MEDIUM 
ENTERPRISE AGENCY, http://www.chusho.meti.go.jp/pamflet/souran/3siryou/3-0-0-0-5toukei 
.html#hyo2 (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). 
122. Share of SMEs in the Japanese Economy, supra note 121; see also JAPAN SMALL 
BUS. RESEARCH INST., MINISTRY OF ECON., TRADE & INDUS., WHITE PAPER ON SMALL AND 
MEDIUM ENTERPRISES IN JAPAN, at v (2009), available at http://www.chusho.meti.go.jp/ 
pamflet/hakusyo/h21/h21_1/2009hakusho_eng.pdf. 
123. In practice, some courts have loosened the delivery requirement for gifts, especial-
ly when corporate shares are involved, introducing something more akin to a multifactored 
analysis for determining whether there was indeed delivery and intent. But this more open-
ended analysis is directed at only one question: what did the giver intend, and did she come 
close enough to effectuating her intentions? Questions of culture and gender come in only as 
a matter of evidence as to the parties’ state of mind. See, e.g., Jean v. Jean, 277 P. 313, 315 
(Cal. 1929); Lynch v. Lynch, 12 P.2d 741, 743 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1932); see also Yamaha 
Corp. of Am. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 362, 375 (Ct. App. 1999); Jaffe 
v. Carroll, 110 Cal. Rptr. 435, 439 (Ct. App. 1973). 
124. See Carol M. Rose, Giving, Trading, Thieving, and Trusting: How and Why Gifts 
Become Exchanges, and (More Importantly) Vice Versa, 44 FLA. L. REV. 295, 303 (1992) 
(arguing that the rigidity and formality in the law of wills reflects suspicion concerning the 
legitimacy of gifts and anticipates the possibility of trickery or theft by the donee); see also 
Knupfer v. Lindblade (In re Dyer), 322 F.3d 1178, 1188-89 (9th Cir. 2003) (exemplifying 
the application of rigid rules for the validation of a gift in the context of a will). 
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on formal doctrines such as “delivery” in the law of gifts because we assume 
that the parties’ commonsense understanding of a gift involves some concept of 
delivery. But in a situation in which the relevant law is not a stand-in for all the 
relevant cultural considerations, whether Toru’s actions happen to match the 
law’s requirements for “delivery,” for example, is almost fortuitous, and allow-
ing the outcome of litigation to turn on such things turns the law into a game of 
technical one-upmanship and chance. 
A case in point: Toru’s claim that his gift fails for lack of delivery is ironic 
given that under Japanese law, delivery is not a necessary element of a legally 
recognizable gift. Mere intent alone suffices. Hence Toru is availing himself of 
what, from a Japanese litigant’s point of view, is a technicality of American 
common law doctrine. 
2. The postcolonial dimension 
But if this is not complicated enough, consider how this conflict incorpo-
rates and in some senses turns upon the effects and aftershocks of a colonial 
legacy125 in which, as mentioned in Part I, tradition is often invented and rein-
vented, such that the search for the “true” Japanese or American custom on a 
given point becomes largely futile. Even the fact that in Japanese law mere in-
tent suffices for a gift (neither the gift contract nor the transfer of ownership re-
quires delivery) may actually be a consequence of ideas adopted from continen-
tal European law.126 We are left with the fragments of many invented 
 
125. The postwar U.S. occupation of Japan (1945-1952) was similar in function to co-
lonization. As historian Eiji Takemae explains, despite the Americans’ reformist agenda, the 
United States ran Japan for more than six years as a de facto military colony under General 
Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. See TAKAMAE EIJI, INSIDE 
GHQ: THE ALLIED OCCUPATION OF JAPAN AND ITS LEGACY, at xxvi (Robert Ricketts & Se-
bastian Swann trans., 2002). According to the historian of international law Antony Anghie, 
throughout its history the United States has declined to term its occupation of other countries 
“colonialism,” instead using concepts like “trusteeship” to help resolve a fundamental con-
tradiction: “how could the United States, born out of a war of independence against colonial-
ism, itself become a colonial power?” ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND 
THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 283 n.40 (2005). 
Although functionally similar to earlier European colonization projects, the ways and 
means of the American use of power in Japan were distinct. The occupation of Japan and the 
establishment of permanent naval bases in Okinawa represent the fulfillment of military 
theorist Alfred Mahan’s vision for a U.S. foreign policy that “build[s] reach, not burdens.” 
JOHN D. KELLY, THE AMERICAN GAME: CAPITALISM, DECOLONIZATION, GLOBAL 
DOMINATION, AND BASEBALL 24 (2006). For an analysis of the Okinawa bases as coloniza-
tion, see Kozue Akibayashi & Suzuyo Takazato, Okinawa: Women’s Struggle for Demilita-
rization, in THE BASES OF EMPIRE: THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE AGAINST U.S. MILITARY POSTS 
243 (Catherine Lutz ed., 2009). 
126. See MINPŌ arts. 176, 549. Japanese law is not fully clear on these questions. Under 
Japanese law, a gift is a “consensual contract” (dakuseikeiyaku): a category of contract bor-
rowed from Roman law which by definition requires nothing more than a meeting of the 
minds. According to Article 549 of the Civil Code, a gift takes effect once there is mutual 
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traditions, available to social actors as tools, levers, and lenses through which 
to frame social and economic interactions, define personal aspirations, and ul-
timately negotiate conflicts. 
In the corporate law context, the American occupation forces legislated the 
ie out of existence in 1947, abolishing its status as a perpetual property holder 
in the civil code and mandating the individualized division of property into 
equal shares127 in a bid to strengthen individual autonomy in Japanese socie-
ty.128 Three years later, the same occupation forces mandated an “American-
style” revision of the Japanese company law.129 The response was dramatic, as 
companies rushed by the thousands to incorporate. What the occupation author-
 
intent between both parties (expression of intent by the donor and acceptance by the donee), 
and nothing further is required. Tsu Chihō Saibansho [Tsu Dist. Ct.] Dec. 4, 2003, Hei 15 
(gyō u) no. 12, SAIBANREI JŌHŌ 1, http://www.courts.go.jp. For example, in Tōkyō Kōtō 
Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] Sept. 18, 2002, Hei 14 (gyō ko) no. 142, SAIBANREI JŌHŌ 1, 
http://www.courts.go.jp, a father in Japan gave money to his daughter in the United States 
and later contested the gift. The Tokyo High Court noted that, although the physical transfer 
of the money occurred at a later point in time, the gift became effective when the father ex-
pressed his intent to advance the funds to his daughter and the daughter accepted. It is not 
clear, however, whether this is due to European influence. According to some authors, the 
bindingness is a consequence of traditional Japanese norms, according to which gifts were of 
great importance and were usually considered binding. 14 SHINPAN CHŪSHAKU MINPŌ 
[REVISED COMMENTARY ON THE CIVIL CODE] §§ 549-554 (Yunoki Kaoru & Takagi Takio 
eds., 1993). In fact, articles 549 and 550 of the Code abolished the form requirement of the 
Meiji period (which had resembled both French and German law) and merely allowed the 
donor to cancel the gift if it was not in writing. MINPŌ art. 550; see Ronald Frank, Law of 
Obligations, in HISTORY OF LAW IN JAPAN SINCE 1868, at 227, 248 (Wilhelm Röhl ed., 2005). 
Effectively, as in French law, the recipient’s position is less stable before than after delivery. 
Tomotaka Fujita, Japan, in TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 261, 262-65 
(Alexander von Ziegler et al. eds., 2d ed. 2011). 
Note also that articles 549 and 550 of the Code concern only the obligation created by 
the gift agreement, not the transfer of ownership. As concerns the need for delivery and for a 
separate agreement on transfer of ownership, a conflict exists between two sources of the 
Japanese Code: French law, where mere agreement suffices, and German law, which re-
quires delivery and a separate agreement. See, e.g., Seizi Tanaka, On Theories About Aliena-
tion of Jus in Rem in the Civil Code of Japan, 5 OSAKA U. L. REV. 25, 25-26 (1957).  
127. See Bachnik, supra note 108, at 160 (“[T]he ie, . . . although widely acknowledged 
as the basic unit in Japanese society, was legislated out of existence by the Occupation-
inspired Civil Code of 1947.”); Karen Garner, Global Feminism and Postwar Reconstruc-
tion: The World YWCA Visitation to Occupied Japan, 1947, 15 J. WORLD HIST. 191, 215 
(2004) (explaining that the American occupation forces mandated individual property rights 
for women, which undermined the authority of the ie as collective property holder); see also 
BEATE SIROTA GORDON, THE ONLY WOMAN IN THE ROOM: A MEMOIR 103-25 (1997) (provid-
ing background on the drafting of the equal rights provisions). 
128. See Bachnik, supra note 108, at 169 (arguing that the problem with the Meiji Civil 
Code from the point of view of the occupation forces was that it “clearly defines succession 
as continuity of the ie and not individual continuity”). 
129. Not surprisingly given this history, the corporation law does not treat dōzoku gai-
sha differently from other companies, and hence family-owned companies are formally sub-
ject to the same rules of incorporation as other corporations under the Commercial Code. See 
generally Kaishahō [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, arts. 25-103 (Hōrei DB), 
http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi (stating the rules of incorporation). 
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ities perhaps missed in all this was that the new corporations were, in many 
cases, the very ie they had banned three years before.130 
The conflict between the parties to this case, then, is a postcolonial predi-
cament—one framed by layers of occupation-era reform projects and local res-
ponses. And this recent history exemplifies how culture can be its own legal 
invention: from the start, the company law in Japan served as a kind of local 
tool, a euphemism, a way of putting things better left unsaid and of interacting 
with the state and with others through the state—that is, as a technical game to 
be played. It is not an exaggeration to say that the dōzoku gaisha is itself an ar-
tifact of the kind of legal technicalities that are the focus of this Article. This is 
a complicated discovery: when we go looking for Japanese culture, in a multi-
culturalist vein, what we find instead are layers of history in which many actors 
have deployed legal technicalities for their own purposes—not some pure cul-
ture outside of law, but legal technicalities in action.131 
3.  The transnational dimension 
As in most multiculturalism problems, it is not only that another culture is 
at issue in the dispute between Toru and Yoshiko or that the other culture is 
produced by an overlay of different normative, legal, and economic regimes. In 
addition, the parties’ relationship is transnational in nature: structured and in-
formed by more than one culture and competing conceptions of each. The in-
terplay creates opportunity for differing understandings of what is right, just, 
and desirable for each person and for the group as a whole—indeed, differing 
understandings of the very facts involved. (For example, what exactly was the 
nature of the agreement about this transfer? The parties actually have different 
recollections and understandings on this point.) 
The very existence of the conflict here reflects a transnational interplay of 
cultures. In Japan, although disputes among rival successors are common at the 
time of the death of the head of a family-owned company, legal disputes be-
tween the head of a family-owned company and other shareholders for control 
of family-owned companies during the lifetime of the head are almost unheard 
of, and the regulatory authorities do not treat this possibility as a serious policy 
concern (as they do for inter-sibling conflicts). Most Japanese would find a 
conflict between parents and children over business affairs to be highly unfor-
tunate and many would assert that it is only rarely ethical for children to chal-
lenge a father’s authority during his lifetime, or for a father to sue his daugh-
 
130. It is also possible, of course, that the occupation government knew exactly what 
was going on.  
131. Our example is far from unique in this respect. Anthropologists have often docu-
mented how pluralist law becomes not simply a way of accommodating the truth about cul-
tural practices, but rather a tool for continuing local politics by other means. Likewise, the 
legal debates about multiculturalism unearth numerous examples of parties deploying legal 
technicalities and conflicts between different legal regimes, in order to define their positions. 
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ter.132 Thus, as is often the case in conflicts over multiculturalism, even the 
party who is asserting an alternative cultural tradition in this conflict is not be-
having entirely as that tradition might expect. After all, Toru has come all the 
way to America to sue his daughter in a U.S. court of law. Toru is picking and 
choosing, among fragmented and hybridized traditions, to fashion his own si-
tuated ethical position. 
The issues here are further complicated by—indeed would not have arisen 
at all were it not for—the opportunities and also the demands of a global econ-
omy. The very existence of this company is a product of Toru’s global business 
model. Yoshiko in turn must satisfy potential creditors about the clarity of her 
title (and hence the availability of her assets for seizure in bankruptcy) simply 
in order to conduct business in the United States.  
Finally, any attempt to unravel this controversy requires confronting the 
pluralistic nature of national legal systems to begin with. Toru’s actions pre-
sume a certain appreciation (or at least interpretation) of how formal state law 
in Japan accommodates norms regarding the administration of economic affairs 
within family-owned companies. He is relying on a pluralistic understanding of 
Japanese law and an assumption that state law delegates certain authority to 
customary law.133 
D. The Feminist Dimensions 
From a feminist perspective, what is ultimately at stake in the conflict be-
tween Yoshiko and Toru is the gendered quality of the kinship hierarchies and 
the power dynamics within the kin group that define economic membership and 
frame personal choices, opportunities, and aspirations. The hypothetical pits a 
daughter’s desire for economic and personal autonomy against a father’s desire 
for respect and the continued economic and social viability of the household, in 
the context of a cultural and legal tradition that places less emphasis on the in-
dividual rights of kinspersons than the Euro-American traditions do. 
A basic context for this dispute is the reality that “Japanese female partici-
pation in management is considerably lower than in other industrialized na-
tions, despite the fact that the female workforce in Japan is among the most 
educated in the world.”134 In 2009, a mere 1.2% of executives at listed Japa-
 
132. Although it has been argued in Japanese legal studies that the Japanese are not in 
fact less litigious than Americans, such arguments focus on litigation among strangers and 
business relations, not among people who see themselves as kin. 
133. For an explanation of delegation as one way that the state can accommodate non-
state law, see Ralf Michaels, The Re-State-Ment of Non-State Law: The State, Choice of 
Law, and the Challenge from Global Legal Pluralism, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1209, 1234-35 
(2005). On legal pluralism in Japan, see MASAJI CHIBA, LEGAL PLURALISM: TOWARD A 
GENERAL THEORY THROUGH JAPANESE LEGAL CULTURE (1989). 
134. Reginald Worthley et al., Workforce Motivation in Japan: An Examination of 
Gender Differences and Management Perceptions, 20 INT’L J. HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 1503, 
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nese companies were women. As of 1995, the statistic was 0.15%. In compari-
son, in the United States, women held 13.5% of executive officer positions in 
Fortune 500 companies in 2009.135 And yet in Japanese family-owned compa-
nies, the situation is more complicated. As Jean Renshaw argues,  
 It is accepted practice for wives in the large corporate families to be in-
strumental in decisions affecting leadership and succession, as they arrange 
marriages, influence which son will become president, and often through their 
own family bring greater wealth and power into the company. . . . As manag-
ers, [women] may be required to wield power directly, but so far they have 
been quite successful at remaining invisible. As a person at the margins, a 
woman manager truly straddles two worlds . . . . Those who spent early years 
without a male sibling in first place felt less trepidation in seeking expanded 
opportunities and trying out new behaviors.136 
The irony, then, is that women in Japan fare better as leaders in those cor-
porations that Western feminists might denounce as overtly patriarchal—
bastions of status rather than contractual relations. However, Renshaw adds, 
whereas women in the West hit a “glass ceiling,” the “shoji screen” is a better 
metaphor for capturing the nature of the discrimination that Japanese women 
confront as managers: “The few women who break into top management are 
invisible. . . . General opinion holds that there are no women managers. Shoji 
screens serve to maintain a collective denial of Japanese women in positions of 
power.”137 
Moreover, in adjudicating legal disputes between members of family-
owned companies, Japanese courts appear to give some weight to their judg-
ments about the behavior and relative fault of each of the parties. Behavior that 
deviates significantly from the relational and hierarchical standard of ethical 
practice is rarely rewarded by the courts. Obedience to the company head, un-
derstood as “a generalized dutifulness, . . . [or] a relatively low level of indivi-
dualistic self-assertion,”138 is the primary ethical imperative for company em-
ployees.139 This ethical imperative reflects a fundamental tenet of Confucian 
 
1505 (2009) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted); see also JEAN R. RENSHAW, KIMONO IN 
THE BOARDROOM: THE INVISIBLE EVOLUTION OF JAPANESE WOMEN MANAGERS 17-18 (1999); 
Masae Yuasa, Japanese Women in Management: Getting Closer to “Realities” in Japan, 11 
ASIA PAC. BUS. REV. 195 (2005); Frank Upham, Clarke Lecture at Cornell Law School: Re-
sistible Force Meets Malleable Object: The Story of the “Introduction” of Norms of Gender 
Equality into Japanese Employment Practice (Apr. 26, 2011). Some recent studies neverthe-
less suggest that Japanese women’s preference for management positions is on the rise. See, 
e.g., Worthley et al., supra, at 1504. 
135. Juro Osawa, Japan Investors: Why No Women, Foreigners in the Boardroom?, 
WALL ST. J. JAPAN REAL TIME (June 30, 2010, 7:06 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/                   
japanrealtime/2010/06/30/japan-investors-why-no-women-foreigners-in-the-boardroom. 
136. RENSHAW, supra note 134, at 120-21. 
137. Id. at 139. 
138. Dore, supra note 120, at 471. 
139. See Ernest Gundling, Ethics and Working with the Japanese: The Entrepreneur 
and the “Elite Course,” CAL. MGMT. REV., Spring 1991, at 25, 30. 
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ideology that children must honor their parents and juniors must honor their se-
niors. 
Yet, for the most part, the conflict between Yoshiko and Toru would not 
even appear on the feminism/culture radar. As already noted, Western feminists 
have been criticized for the tendency to prioritize culture as the source of wom-
en’s oppression and leave unaddressed the role of economics in constructing 
women’s identities and concerns.140 However, it should not be assumed that 
focusing on economics instead means putting aside the feminism/culture de-
bate; even issues of corporate law can return us to the debate. As Vasuki Ne-
siah put it in the context of third world feminism, “the putative distinction be-
tween the economic and the cultural is itself another moment in the production 
of each—a denial of the culture of economy and the economics of culture.”141 
Consider, for example, our treatment of this conflict as an issue of gift law. 
Adding a cultural dimension to the analysis revealed what seems like a conflict 
at the level of the rule between Japanese law, which does not have a delivery 
requirement for a gift, and California law, which has very clear formalistic re-
quirements. However, Carol Rose reminds us that law and tradition reflect the 
gendered nature of gift giving in American culture.142 If the “quintessential 
gift” is one “motivated by generosity and a spirit of selfless love without 
thought of reciprocity,”143 and such gifts are associated particularly with wom-
en, one might expect courts to find, for example, that daughters who care for 
their fathers throughout their lives are not entitled to compensation from their 
fathers’ estates because their work was simply a “labor of love”—a free and 
selfless gift. On that theory, then, what seems like a conflict between Japanese 
law and California law at the level of the rule may turn out in its application to 
be no conflict at all, as judges in both societies seem more willing to favor the 
interests of fathers over those of daughters in the specific arena of father-
daughter gifts. 
What of our treatment of the conflict between Yoshiko and Toru under 
corporate law? Conflicts that fall into the doctrinal bucket of corporate law 
have only rarely captured feminist attention.144 In addition, feminists and mul-
ticulturalists alike would most likely fall in line with the mainstream doctrinal 
 
140. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text; cf. NANCY FRASER, From Redistri-
bution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a “Postsocialist” Age, in JUSTICE 
INTERRUPTUS: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE “POSTSOCIALIST” CONDITION 11 (1997); Lila 
Abu-Lughod, Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on Cul-
tural Relativism and Its Others, 104 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 783 (2002). 
141. Nesiah, supra note 13, at 141 (footnote omitted). 
142. See Rose, supra note 124, at 301. 
143. Id. at 302. 
144. See Kellye Y. Testy, Capitalism and Freedom—For Whom?: Feminist Legal 
Theory and Progressive Corporate Law, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2004, at 87, 
96. 
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view that what is at stake here are simple garden-variety arm’s-length transac-
tions. 
Recall that introducing a cultural dimension into the corporate law analysis 
of our hypothetical revealed the presumption that the eldest son will succeed 
his father as head of a dōzoku gaisha, or Japanese lineage company.145 In our 
case, it is Toru’s son who would eventually own and run the parent company 
while Yoshiko would own and run the smaller American subsidiary. Given the 
presumption of male primogeniture, it is perhaps not surprising that American 
feminists, in fact, intervened against the ie after World War II. Closer inspec-
tion of the postcolonial dimension reveals that American occupation forces in 
Japan legislated the ie out of existence at the urging of American feminists 
within the ranks of the occupation bureaucracy, who became convinced that the 
Japanese household was a patriarchal institution. And indeed, as is much com-
mented on by Japanese feminists, the ie has been in decline since the American 
reforms. But the feminist theorist Chizuko Ueno argues that the rise of the nuc-
lear family as a result of American reforms aimed at creating “salary men” and 
“housewives” has led to the widespread repression of women in Japan in ways 
heretofore unknown in Japanese society.146 These developments underline 
another point made by those who fault Western feminists for making practices 
like veiling and clitoridectomy their primary target; namely, that the focus on 
an “exotic” culture as the culprit misses the ways in which feminists themselves 
are implicated in the production of gender inequalities in the non-Western 
world.147 
The feminist dimensions of our example are more complex and indetermi-
nate still.148 On the one hand, the mainstream doctrinal view that Yoshiko’s re-
lationship to Toru is legally irrelevant chimes with Western liberal feminist 
struggles that count as precious victories the recognition that women’s legal 
status should be independent of their family status.149 On the other, as against 
the atomistic and generalized view of the self taken by American law, many 
 
145. See RENSHAW, supra note 134, at 162 (finding, based on a sociological study, that 
in Japanese family-owned companies, “[w]omen with brothers are not as likely to head their 
family businesses”). 
146. UENO CHIZUKO, KINDAI KAZOKU NO SEIRITSU TO SHŪEN [THE ESTABLISHMENT AND 
DEMISE OF THE MODERN FAMILY] (1994). 
147. See, e.g., L. Amede Obiora, Feminism, Globalization, and Culture: After Beijing, 4 
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 355, 372-73 (1997). An economic example often given is the 
fact that Western women’s ability to work outside the home has relied on non-Western 
women taking up some of their traditional homemaker roles. See, e.g., Ruba Salih, Toward 
an Understanding of Transnationalism and Gender, in GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra 
note 69, at 231, 235 (discussing Moroccan migrant women in Italy). 
148. See generally Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology 
and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983). 
149. For an annotated bibliography, see Claudia Zaher, When a Woman’s Marital Sta-
tus Determined Her Legal Status: A Research Guide on the Common Law Doctrine of Co-
verture, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 459 (2002). 
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cultural feminists have asserted a concept of the social or relational self.150 This 
reconception of the self fundamentally acknowledges the part that the particu-
larities of relationships play in constituting self-identity and the meaning of in-
dividual lives, and it argues for recognizing in law the role of these relation-
ships. 
Along cultural feminist lines, Terry O’Neill has argued for applying an 
“ethic of care” to corporate law: “Feminist scholars point out that the capacity 
to respond to the needs of others is a core aspect of being human. A feminist 
understanding of corporate law thus recognizes that this aspect of human nature 
operates in corporate relations as well as in intimate, personal relations.”151 Al-
though O’Neill is not writing about corporate relations that are, in fact, also in-
timate, personal relations, her approach would arguably not disregard that Toru 
and Yoshiko are father and daughter. 
The culture of the household in our example as both corporation and kin-
ship highlights a more general contrast between O’Neill’s feminist analysis of 
corporate law, which would approach the corporation more like a family, and 
feminist family law scholars who treat the family more like a corporation. 
Many important feminist projects resist the carving out of family law from laws 
governing the market—they insist on recognizing household work as work, for 
example.152 In light of the ie’s history, it is striking that Janet Halley and Kerry 
Rittich, among others, argue for the household over the family as the best unit 
of analysis for comparative family law and for family law tout court.153 
Finally, the feminist dimension adds further nuance to the transnational 
dimension of our hypothetical case. As noted earlier, the issues here would not 
have come into existence at all were it not for a global economy. While femin-
ist scholarship on globalization tends to concentrate on the ways in which the 
demands of globalization reinforce inequalities of gender and race, some of this 
scholarship also identifies globalization’s potential to challenge women’s so-
cioeconomic positions by “allowing women to become economic providers for 
 
150. See, e.g., ANNETTE C. BAIER, MORAL PREJUDICES 24-32 (1994); VIRGINIA HELD, 
FEMINIST MORALITY: TRANSFORMING CULTURE, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS 57-63 (1993); 
CATHERINE KELLER, FROM A BROKEN WEB: SEPARATION, SEXISM, AND SELF 1-4 (1986); Ma-
rilyn Friedman, Feminism and Modern Friendship: Dislocating the Community, in FEMINISM 
AND POLITICAL THEORY 143, 143-44 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 1990), Jennifer Nedelsky, Re-
conceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7, 8-9 
(1989). 
151. Terry A. O’Neill, Gender and Corporate Personhood: A Feminist Response to 
David Millon, 2 STAN. AGORA 77, 83 (2001). 
152. See, for instance, the American Journal of Comparative Law’s recent Special Issue 
on Comparative Family Law, and especially the introduction by Janet Halley and Kerry Rit-
tich, Critical Directions in Comparative Family Law: Genealogies and Contemporary Stu-
dies of Family Law Exceptionalism, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 753 (2010). 
153. See id. at 755-60. 
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themselves and for their transnational networks.”154 California law gave Yoshi-
ko an opportunity to assert her control of the American subsidiary as against 
Japanese expectations of her as a dutiful daughter. Likewise, Toru’s global 
business model together with the gendered differences in Japanese and U.S. 
corporate culture gave Toru an opportunity both to reject the Japanese cultural 
presumption that his son would be his sole successor and also to have Yoshiko 
work in the United States, where the mentality toward female executives has 
changed more than in Japan. 
Thus, although our private law hypothetical about a transfer of shares may, 
at first, have looked quite remote from the feminism/culture debate, it turns out 
to be an example of the same conflict found in familiar cases like veils and po-
lygamous marriages, which are usually treated as raising questions for public 
law. Our hypothetical is perhaps more dizzying than these easily recognizable 
cases because even before we reach the matter of cultural difference, a deci-
sionmaker may have different intuitions about the problem depending on 
whether we choose to see the collectivity at issue here as a family or as a com-
pany.  
If we are facing a company, hierarchy is of little concern as long as it per-
tains to matters of company affairs (personalized hierarchy of course is harass-
ment) or as long as employees of equal rank are afforded roughly equal rights 
and responsibilities. If this is a company, Yoshiko’s unhappiness with her fa-
ther’s control—even if any reasonable person would be unhappy with her 
boss’s interference—is really of little legal concern. On the other hand, if this is 
a company, we also imagine the relations between the parties as arm’s-length 
transactions, and we do not hesitate to hold them to the letter of their bargains. 
So if Toru wanted to retain control, he should have bargained for it explicitly.  
But if this is a family, then hierarchy comes to look like a much more per-
nicious matter of tradition-bound, gendered, and age-based pressure, if not op-
pression. Yoshiko comes to look much more like someone in need of saving by 
the law. At the same time, if this is a family then we might be far more sympa-
thetic to Toru’s assertion that the legal documents do not tell the whole story of 
the obligations and arrangements between the parties.  
In sum, the dispute between Toru and Yoshiko can be seen as a classic fe-
minist conundrum of the public/private distinction, as it grafts onto diverse bo-
dies of law, mutates, disperses, and reorganizes in new forms in the process of 
crossing legal and cultural boundaries. In this context, we also begin to see the 
interaction of law and culture as really a matter of the parties playing with law, 
 
154. Chantal Thomas, Migrant Domestic Workers in Egypt: A Case Study of the Eco-
nomic Family in Global Context, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 987, 1020 (2010); see SARAH 
GAMMAGE ET AL., TRADE IMPACT REVIEW: FRAMEWORK FOR GENDER ASSESSMENTS OF 
TRADE AND INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 41 (2002); Kerry Rittich, Black Sites: Locating the 
Family and Family Law in Development, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 1023, 1025 (2010); Saskia Sas-
sen, Women’s Burden: Counter-Geographies of Globalization and the Feminization of Sur-
vival, 71 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 255 (2002); Thomas, supra, at 1020-22. 
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and with culture, as national laws become available as moves in a recursive set 
of conflicts and hierarchies. 
III. THE CONTRIBUTION OF A CONFLICTS APPROACH: INTRODUCING 
TECHNICALITIES 
In this Part, we work through our hypothetical once more, this time in ac-
cordance with a conflict of laws analysis. A traditional choice of law analysis in 
conflicts155 might proceed through the following steps. Having determined that 
it has jurisdiction over the dispute in question, the court would first take notice 
of the existence of a “foreign element” to the case, usually by way of the plead-
ing and proof of foreign law submitted by the parties.156 Second, it would cha-
racterize the issue or issues involved.157 For example, is a dispute about allo-
cating property between divorcing spouses a matter of family law, of property 
law, or even of contract law if the spouses had a prenuptial agreement? Third, 
the court would identify the relevant connecting factors for each issue depend-
ing on the characterization,158 and fourth, it would determine which law applies 
to the issue according to the particular choice of law methodology in use in that 
jurisdiction.159 If the issue is characterized as title in stock and transfer of 
shares, for instance, then according to the traditional choice of law rules, the 
connecting factor is the place where the corporation is incorporated and the ap-
plicable law is the law of that place.160 Fifth, if the prevailing choice of law 
methodology points to the law of another jurisdiction, the court would consider 
whether the public policy exception bars the application of that law.161 Sixth, 
the court would apply that law to the particular issue. 
Our aim, however, is not to establish that our example is really a conflicts 
case about whether Japanese or Californian law, as the law of states, applies. 
Rather, it is to illustrate the value of conflicts as an intellectual style and, in 
particular, to show that this style offers a way to reveal and do justice to the 
complicated issues of gender, law, and culture our example raises without be-
coming bogged down. As such, we depart from standard conflict of laws in 
three ways. First, although conflicts as a discipline is traditionally concerned 
only with state-made law, we assume that conflicts analysis can, at least in 
theory, be applied to questions of overlap among any normative communi-
 
155. On the distinction between jurisdiction and choice of law, see infra Part III.B.1. 
156. See infra Part III.A. 
157. See infra Part III.B.2. 
158. See infra Part III.B.2. 
159. See infra Parts III.B.3, III.B.4. 
160. Cf. Porto v. Canon, U.S.A., Inc., No. 81 C 305, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17611, at 
*4-5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 1981) (holding that a corporation organized under U.S. law is a U.S. 
corporation for Title VII purposes, even if it is a wholly owned subsidiary of a Japanese cor-
poration). 
161. See infra Part III.B.5. 
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ties.162 Second, our discussion modifies slightly the order of the choice of law 
steps just listed so as to bring out their correspondence with issues in the femin-
ist debates about multiculturalism. We start with the steps that capture and ope-
rationalize key insights from the debate, and then proceed to the steps that go 
further and thus reveal fresh possibilities. For the same reason, while this Part 
is organized to correspond to the steps in a standard choice of law analysis, we 
name and describe each step as an intellectual move, which is a third differ-
ence. Our interest is in asking how thinking through feminism/culture problems 
analogically, as if they were technical conflicts questions,163 might open up 
new avenues of theorizing. In other words, the conflicts doctrines we discuss 
are not simply tools for resolving disputes, although—and this is the trick—that 
is precisely how they are structured. Rather, they are first and foremost tools 
with which to think. 
A.  Capturing the Insights of the Feminism/Culture Debate 
1. Seeing culture—the “foreign element” 
Our first conflicts move is to notice that the dispute between Toru and Yo-
shiko has several connections to Japan and its law and culture (in addition to its 
obvious connections to California). In a substantive law analysis—whether ap-
plying California’s corporate law, trust law, or law of gifts—such cultural con-
siderations are more often than not a mere afterthought. In contrast, conflicts 
starts with the question of which culture should provide the relevant substantive 
norms. Thus the very existence of the field, writ large, serves as a constant re-
minder that there are other frameworks of understanding any particular norma-
tive question and ours is only one among them. This was similarly the cultural 
relativists’ critique of an Okin-style framing of the debate as feminism versus 
culture. They rejected the underlying assumption that “‘culture’ is what nonli-
beral peoples are . . . ruled and ordered by,” or more expressively, that “we are 
a democracy while they are a culture.”164 
Here, both parties are Japanese citizens; the parent company is Japanese; 
one of the parties was in Japan when he negotiated and signed all agreements 
and transfer documents; and both parties signed original versions in Japanese. 
Furthermore, if indeed there was agreement on a “name-only” transfer of 
shares, this agreement references and arguably even represents a tacit choice of 
Japanese law.  
Although these connections might ultimately not be controlling in a stan-
dard conflict of laws analysis, the point is that by attending to the “foreign ele-
 
162. See Paul Schiff Berman, Conflict of Laws, Globalization, and Cosmopolitan Plu-
ralism, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1105 (2005). 
163. See infra Part IV. 
164. BROWN, supra note 40, at 150-51; see discussion supra Part I.B. 
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ment,” conflicts requires us to see culture, so to speak. We recognize, for ex-
ample, that what seems like a quirky twist on the traditional corporate law 
problem in this conflict—the fusion of kin and corporation—is in fact the norm 
rather than the exception in Japan. And for the conflicts approach it also mat-
ters that from the point of view of the Japanese state, whose interests the Cali-
fornia forum must consider in modern conflicts doctrine, this kin group as cor-
poration is a crucial building block of the economy. Thus, Toru’s decision 
seems less irrational when seen against Japanese, rather than Californian, ex-
pectations. The distinctions between a corporation and a family seem more flu-
id and contingent. Family ties seem to carry broader significance than we might 
otherwise have thought.  
Unlike a straight corporate law analysis, then, the conflicts lens forces at 
least some degree of attention to the nature of collectivity and agency within 
the Japanese household, and thus to the questions of hierarchy and gender de-
scribed in Part II. This in turn demands attention to what forms of contestation 
are possible within kin groups/economic collectives. 
2. Culture and agency—pleading and proving foreign law 
In common law conflict of laws, the parties must plead an issue of foreign 
law. If it is not pleaded then the law of the forum is applied.165 In contrast, in 
most civil law countries, the court itself takes judicial notice of foreign law 
whether or not it is pleaded by the parties.166 The common law approach to 
proof of foreign law has been criticized for allowing the parties to defeat proper 
outcomes by choosing not to plead the foreign law or doing a bad job of prov-
ing it. But in the context of a reflexive approach to truth questions, the value of 
this party autonomy lies in the agency it gives the parties to decide whether to 
situate themselves within one culture or another on a particular issue. This 
choice resonates with the relativist critique of Western feminists’ tendency to 
assume that non-Western women are defined by their culture rather than exer-
cising any degree of choice within it. It also resonates with the post-essentialist 
culture-minimizing position taken by Anne Phillips, for example, that if culture 
is invented tradition, then a defensible multiculturalism will put human agency 
much more at the center. 
At common law, and to this day in many common law jurisdictions, the 
parties must usually also prove foreign law through the introduction of expert 
evidence.167 Traditionally, the judge cannot determine the foreign law for her-
 
165. See 1 DICEY, MORRIS AND COLLINS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 255 (Lawrence Col-
lins ed., 14th ed. 2006); PETER HAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 602-03 (5th ed. 2010); 1 
JANET WALKER, CASTEL & WALKER: CANADIAN CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. 7 (6th ed. 2005). 
166. See Maarit Jänterä-Jareborg, Foreign Law in National Courts: A Comparative 
Perspective, 304 RECUEIL DES COURS 181, 272-73, 289-91 (2003). For an overview of the 
issue, see generally id. passim. 
167. See supra note 165. 
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self, but must consult those with more situated knowledge. More recently, in 
many U.S. jurisdictions the judge can conduct her own inquiry into foreign law, 
but the results of this inquiry have the ambiguous status of quasi-fact.168 Since 
foreign law is a question of quasi-fact to be ascertained through expert testimo-
ny or comparative legal research, the judge cannot presume to interpret or ap-
ply the foreign law based solely on her expert vantage point.169 Likewise, the 
court’s decision about the nature of foreign law has no precedential value either 
for the foreign jurisdiction or for the meaning of the foreign law in the court’s 
jurisdiction.170 Stamped into these doctrines, then, is an appreciation for the 
difficulties of understanding other cultures. They also give expression to a core 
feminist concern for giving respect for the “other.”171 
In more mechanical conflicts analyses, unfortunately, the deceptively sim-
ple question “What is the rule in each jurisdiction?” is often treated as a mere 
afterthought.172 As a consequence, what U.S. judges apply is often not truly the 
foreign law but instead some virtual law, the result of expert witness testimony 
(often crafted in one party’s favor).173 But this is to miss much of the revelatory 
potential of a conflicts approach. Treating proof of foreign law as a simple me-
chanical question papers over the norms at issue for each community impli-
cated by the case. The testimony of the parties’ experts or the judge’s own re-
search can seek to describe the foreign law as more than a collection of black-
letter rules: it can direct attention to the subtleties of institutional arrangements, 
 
168. See Bodum USA, Inc. v. La Cafetiere, Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 631-34 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(Posner, J., concurring) (criticizing the use of expert testimony to establish foreign law); see 
also Gregory S. Alexander, The Application and Avoidance of Foreign Law in the Law of 
Conflicts, 70 NW. U. L. REV. 602 (1975). 
169. But see Bodum, 621 F.3d at 633 (Posner, J., concurring) (“When the testimony 
concerns a scientific or other technical issue, it may be unreasonable to expect a judge to re-
solve the issue without the aid of such testimony. But judges are experts on law, and there is 
an abundance of published materials, in the form of treatises, law review articles, statutes, 
and cases . . . to provide neutral illumination of issues of foreign law.”). Compare Nils Jan-
sen & Ralf Michaels, Die Auslegung und Fortbildung ausländischen Rechts [Interpretation 
and Development of Foreign Law], 116 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ZIVILPROZESS 3, 19-44 (2003), on 
the ideal of a foreign law perspective. 
170. But see Jansen & Michaels, supra note 169, at 52 (suggesting that courts, when in-
terpreting their own law, should pay attention to interpretations of that law given by foreign 
courts). 
171. See discussion supra Parts I.B, I.D. 
172. This relative lack of interest is in strong opposition to the relevance that proof of 
foreign law has in practice, especially where the designated law is that of a foreign nation. 
For example, U.S. courts have traditionally shown great unease with Japanese law. Judge 
Posner remarked in one decision that “the law applicable to the issues in the case is almost 
certainly Japanese law, with which American judges have little familiarity. In fact, as we 
said, even the lawyers in this case, though their clients are Japanese firms, have little fami-
liarity with Japanese law.” U.S.O. Corp. v. Mizuho Holding Co., 547 F.3d 749, 751 (7th Cir. 
2008).  
173. For recent criticism of the role of experts in proving foreign law, see Bodum, 621 
F.3d at 629. 
KNOP, MICHAELS & RILES 64 STAN. L. REV. 589 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/9/2012 5:18 PM 
March 2012] CULTURE AND CONFLICT OF LAWS 631 
policy choices, and interactions between law on the books and law in action.174 
In our hypothetical dispute, for example, a decisionmaker who looked no fur-
ther than the letter of the Japanese company law would find no substantive dif-
ference between the laws of Japan and California on the question of whether 
ownership of shares confers control over those shares. And yet a more subtle 
and inquisitive decisionmaker might follow up on Toru’s assertion that the 
transfer was “in name only,” and hence would learn that unlike in California, 
there is some sort of legal practice in Japan—a practice of quasi-formal legal 
status—called “name-only” shareholding. 
The rules on proving foreign law are intended to establish what the foreign 
law is, and in this sense conflict of laws on the surface seems to succumb to 
cultural essentialism. Nonetheless, the adversarial nature of this truth quest en-
codes the post-essentialist idea that the truth of foreign law is contestable and 
that what is established is a product of both competing testimony by foreign 
law experts and the judge’s perspective on that testimony. Whereas the need to 
plead foreign law corresponds to a commitment to respect women’s choices 
about their relationship to their culture and to the post-essentialist recognition 
that what their issue-by-issue choices produce may be a cultural hybrid, the 
need to prove foreign law presents women with an opportunity to articulate 
their account of their community’s norms. This corresponds to the sort of cul-
ture-transforming positions taken by post-essentialist legal feminists like Mad-
havi Sunder. Indeed, the first of Sunder’s three procedural prescriptions is that 
instead of privileging the (male) elite’s account of the community’s norms, le-
gal decisionmakers should place elites and dissenters on an equal footing when 
a dispute is brought to them.175 But, as called for by anthropologist Saba Mah-
mood’s work on the politics of piety among Egyptian women,176 party auton-
omy in conflicts also guards against the assumption that women will necessari-
ly offer more egalitarian accounts of their culture. Imagine, in our example, that 
Yoshiko accepted, in the alternative, that Japanese law applied to the dispute. 
She might want to lay the ground for the public policy exception to choice of 
law177 by proving that “name-only” shareholding is bound up with the discri-
minatory norm that the eldest son succeeds his father as the head of the ie. And 
Toru might counter by seeking to establish one of the other accounts we de-
scribed in Part II: that in practice women may exert considerable power behind 
the scenes in Japanese family-owned companies, that the norm of male primo-
geniture is less important than the economic well-being and survival of the ie, 
that globalization has eroded the norm of male primogeniture, or that Toru’s 
global business model avoids the norm by planning to leave Yoshiko the com-
 
174. Cf. id. at 638-39 (Wood, J., concurring). 
175. Sunder, supra note 53, at 1466-67. 
176. See MAHMOOD, supra note 67, at 2-4, 10-14. 
177. See infra Part III.B.5. 
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pany’s subsidiary in a country where she faces less discrimination as a female 
executive. 
While the parties’ experts or the judge’s own research can seek to describe 
the foreign law as more than a collection of black-letter rules, the judge never-
theless cannot choose the more progressive account of the foreign law if that is 
not her best assessment of the law as it is. Thus, while competing testimony can 
open up space for such accounts, the judge’s task also responds to feminists 
who caution that the recognition that culture is made, and can therefore be un-
made or remade, should not obscure the power dynamics that perpetuate a cul-
ture in its current institutional form. 
B.  Revealing New Possibilities 
In the previous Subpart we described how certain doctrines in conflict of 
laws capture and operationalize important insights of the feminism/culture de-
bate. We now want to show how other conflicts doctrines go beyond the current 
debate and thus press us to theorize it in more complex ways. 
1. Splitting the power to decide from the question of whether to defer 
to another normative community—jurisdiction and choice of law 
In the very first move of seeing culture in the dispute, we are also effec-
tuating a powerful analytical shift that is everyday business in conflict of laws 
but quite counterintuitive elsewhere. We are splitting jurisdictional questions 
from choice of law questions—or at least acknowledging that they might be 
different and indeed that each might be governed by a different set of rules and 
norms. In other words, we are acknowledging that just because an authority has 
the power to impose its value system on all the parties does not necessarily 
mean that it must or should do so. It can exercise jurisdiction and still remain 
open to the possibility that it might defer to another body of law—another nor-
mative system. Or, put the other way around, we are acknowledging that even 
if an authority does not provide the applicable body of law, it may still exercise 
its power of jurisdiction to ensure an adequate forum. 
The distinctiveness of this approach is perhaps clearer when contrasted 
with Ayelet Shachar’s federalism-style approach to conflicts between feminist 
and multiculturalist values.178 Shachar’s proposal involves dividing up jurisdic-
tion over a given issue, to give some authority to the minority community to 
effectuate its cultural values and some authority to the majority to effectuate 
feminist concerns. In a case like Lovelace, for example, Shachar would divide 
questions of membership from questions of resources; she might grant the indi-
genous community the power to decide whether Sandra Lovelace regains her 
Indian status when her marriage to a non-Indian ends in divorce, and grant the 
 
178. See SHACHAR, supra note 77, at 117-45. 
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encompassing state the authority to determine what access Lovelace would 
have to resources allocated to Indians.179 Shachar argues that the advantage of 
creating such “multicultural jurisdictions” is that neither community’s authority 
could trump the other’s. This division, she argues, preserves a powerful ele-
ment of cultural autonomy while also giving women in the group leverage to 
advocate for change from within. It should be added that this division also de-
pends on the indigenous community having a decisional authority and one that 
appears adequate to the question allocated. 
With respect to our hypothetical we might ask, as Shachar does in formu-
lating her proposal, whether a California court really should hear Toru’s claim 
(or parts of his claim) at all. Perhaps it should defer to a Japanese tribunal on, 
say, the family law issues at stake. But Shachar’s type of analysis would stop 
here. That is, if California asserts jurisdiction with regard to a particular issue, 
it applies its own law to that issue. Conversely, if Japan hears an issue, it ap-
plies Japanese norms. 
Conflicts doctrine envisages another possibility. It splits off the question of 
who has authority to decide (jurisdiction) from the question of which normative 
community’s values should apply (choice of law). Even assuming that Califor-
nia has the authority to hear the claim, conflicts doctrine insists that there is a 
further question of deference to be asked. In thinking through the dispute, 
should California, via its courts, defer to the values of another political com-
munity? Or on the other side of the coin, assuming that another political com-
munity’s values apply, should California decline to hear the claim? Even if no 
other forum exists, for instance? The key possibility opened up by the move we 
term “splitting” is that the California court might take jurisdiction and yet 
choose to effectuate Japanese cultural norms rather than Californian norms—
or, as we will see, apply Japanese cultural norms to some issues and Califor-
nian norms to others. 
In fact, the jurisdictional question has yet a further dimension. Under a 
doctrine known as forum non conveniens, the California court might have ju-
risdiction but nevertheless defer to Japan if Japan also has jurisdiction. One of 
the factors considered is whether the law of the other jurisdiction applies 
(which means that jurisdiction and choice of law are not entirely split off from 
one another).180 However, the applicable law is only one of several factors for 
forum non conveniens, and frequently not the decisive one. More importantly, 
in light of concerns about the availability and nature of the actual institutional 
channels through which women can contest interpretations of their culture, 
dismissal can be granted only if an adequate alternative forum exists. In other 
 
179. Cf. id. at 119-22. Shachar discusses a similar U.S. case, Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). SHACHAR, supra note 77, at 18-20, 142 n.51. On Martinez, see 
also Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 
U. CHI. L. REV. 671 (1989). 
180. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1981); Gulf Oil Corp. v. 
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947). 
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words, dismissal can be granted only if the foreign community provides for a 
decisional institution and a fair hearing can be expected from that institution, 
making it defensible to refer the parties to that institution instead. 
2. “As if” (I)—characterization 
Most techniques and approaches for determining whether and to what ex-
tent foreign law applies to a dispute begin with characterization—the evalua-
tion of the nature of the legal question. The dispute between Toru and Yoshiko 
could be characterized in a number of ways. If it is characterized as a matter of 
corporate law, the crucial legal question is whether the transfer documents con-
ferred upon Yoshiko full rights to control or some lesser set of rights. If charac-
terized instead as a matter of the law of gifts, the dispute turns on whether Toru 
“gave” the shares to Yoshiko and if he did, what legal rights and obligations 
ensue. Finally, if the dispute is characterized as a matter of family law, then the 
crucial question is what power Toru has to structure Yoshiko’s choices, oppor-
tunities and assets, both for now and for the future when he will no longer be 
the head of the family. 
Characterization, of course, is not unique to conflict of laws. As will be ap-
parent, at least two of these possible characterizations map onto possible subs-
tantive law theories of the case. And, in the feminist context, the innovation of 
Shachar’s multicultural-jurisdictions approach rests on what is essentially a 
characterization question (in her example, is the issue of divorce one of mem-
bership or resources?).181 
What is unique to characterization in conflicts, however, is a combination 
of two features: self-reflexivity paired with what we will call an “as if” modali-
ty. As to the first, the very structure of a conflicts problem is reflexive because, 
as explained above, a conflict of laws by definition involves two or more legal 
systems imagined as laterally rather than hierarchically related to one anoth-
er.182 Conflicts recognizes that even the initial characterization of the issue 
must take place from the situated viewpoint of one system or another. There is 
no “view from nowhere” that can be used to capture the legal essence of the in-
stitution or conflict in question. Similarly, much feminist analysis, informed by 
the insights of cultural relativism, will quickly recognize in our hypothetical the 
need to be suspicious of our immediate instincts about the cultural and legal 
facts. As we saw in Part II, at issue is a company that is actually a family, in a 
cultural context in which family is more like the forum legal system’s concep-
tion of a company to begin with. 
 
181. See SHACHAR, supra note 77, at 131-32. 
182. Even when a conflict involves political units that are hierarchically arranged, such 
as a conflict between state law and customary law, the conflicts move is to think more later-
ally about the relationship between the two. 
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In contrast, although Shachar’s approach divides jurisdiction between the 
minority community and the larger state based on characterization of the issue, 
she leaves unexamined whether a given issue can be said in essence to have one 
character or another. Also unexamined is the possibility that the community 
and the state might disagree on the characterization of a given issue, perhaps 
precisely because of their different cultural standpoints. In other words, Sha-
char grants the decisionmaker (the judge or bureaucrat, as agents of one inter-
ested party, the state) the power to characterize without coming to terms with 
how the characterization of an issue is in itself a highly loaded cultural practice 
about which there may be significant and legitimate disagreement. Moreover, 
as conflicts scholars know well, the characterization of a dispute one chooses 
may ultimately dictate the outcome. 
Thus the reflexive orientation of conflicts shares with the most sophisti-
cated feminist critiques of multiculturalism a deep, persistent, and framing 
awareness of the situatedness of one’s claims. In this sense, conflicts thorough-
ly absorbs the relativist critique that emerged in response to the Okin-style 
framing of the debate as equality versus culture. Yet if such feminist theory 
tends to bog down in reflexivity, the response of conflicts as a field is dramati-
cally different. The decisionmaker makes her own characterization, while fully 
recognizing that other jurisdictions implicated in the case might characterize 
the issues differently. The conflicts approach is to say, for example, “We call 
this transaction a matter of family law, recognizing all the while that it would 
also have been perfectly legitimate to frame it as a matter of property law.” 
Characterization is in this sense not a truth claim; it is a provisional technique 
for resolving a very real clash of values, an “as if.” This stance has a certain re-
sonance with the idea of positionality found in more general feminist theory, 
which acknowledges truth as situated, partial, and therefore provisional, but 
nevertheless as a basis for feminist commitment and political action.183 
Conflicts’ open acknowledgement of the normative situatedness of charac-
terization, it should be added, is a function of the field’s history. Characteriza-
tion was a prime target in the early twentieth-century realist critique of tradi-
tional conflict of laws.184 First, characterization was critiqued as ontologically 
 
183. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 880-86 
(1990). 
184. See Ernest G. Lorenzen, The Theory of Qualifications and the Conflict of Laws, 20 
COLUM. L. REV. 247 (1920); see also Walter Wheeler Cook, “Characterization” in the Con-
flict of Laws, 51 YALE L.J. 191, 194 (1941); Ernest G. Lorenzen, The Qualification, Classifi-
cation, or Characterization Problem in the Conflict of Laws, 50 YALE L.J. 743 (1941). The 
criticism of ontological naïveté is justified only insofar as characterization is viewed as a 
way to determine the “true” nature of an issue—in other words, as an ontological claim. Al-
though language in judicial opinions occasionally suggests such an (ill-fated) search for a 
“true nature,” a proper understanding of characterization, and the one prevalent in Europe 
and arguably also in the United States, does not make such ontological claims. Instead, cha-
racterization is functional. GERHARD KEGEL & KLAUS SCHURIG, INTERNATIONALES 
PRIVATRECHT [PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW] 346-56 (9th ed. 2004). 
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naive. No issue is, ontologically speaking, “tort” or “contract”—it becomes a 
matter of tort or contract because actual legal thinkers choose to frame it as 
such. The critics argued that the assumption that there were “right answers” to 
characterization questions concealed underlying policy considerations guiding 
the judicial determination of the applicable law, since the choice of characteri-
zation often dictated outcomes.185 Second, and relatedly, characterization was 
portrayed as an “escape device”: according to the critique, judges faced with 
unpalatable outcomes to their choice of law analysis could simply 
(re)characterize the issues in order to avoid the application of an undesired 
law.186 The sedimenting of these critiques over the last century has meant that 
when conflicts specialists characterize, they do so with a deep sensitivity to the 
fact that there is no single “right answer” to the characterization question. 
3. Slicing issue by issue—dépeçage 
Conflicts takes the foregoing analysis one step further. To give one exam-
ple, assume we characterize our hypothetical dispute between Toru and Yoshi-
ko as a general matter of corporate law. Under the conflicts doctrine of 
dépeçage (from the French dépecer, meaning “to carve up”), we might then de-
cide to apply Japanese corporate law to the substantive question of whether the 
transfer of shares transferred both ownership and control or only ownership, but 
to slice out the subquestion of whether Toru’s subjective understanding of the 
transfer is relevant. This subquestion could in turn be characterized as a proce-
dural question concerning when exceptions to the parol evidence rule should be 
entertained, and the forum might choose to apply its own procedural law to that 
question even as it recognizes that Japanese norms should govern the general 
question of whether control is separable from ownership of shares. 
As the example of dépeçage illustrates, the ingenious insight of conflicts is 
that we can gain purchase on a clash of cultures by slicing it down issue by is-
sue. Two societies may have conflicting views of women’s authority over reli-
gious affairs but not over economic affairs, for instance. Although this insight 
is commonsensical among conflicts specialists, it is worth pausing to under-
stand how avant-garde it is, theoretically speaking: When faced with a clash of 
normative values—a clash between, say, certain liberal feminist values and cer-
tain other values—one need not decide which trumps in the abstract or in gen-
eral. One can focus rather on the specific legal question at hand and slice the 
problem down, recognizing that one normative system might trump for some 
purposes, and another might trump for other purposes. 
To illustrate further, if we characterize our hypothetical dispute as a ques-
tion of gift law, then the general question is whether this gift gave Yoshiko the 
 
185. See Cook, supra note 184, at 200-01. 
186. Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 
DUKE L.J. 171, 175. 
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power to do as she wishes with the company. This legal question about power 
and control in the context of hierarchical kinship relations raises dilemmas for 
feminism/culture analysis. As we saw, the common law’s suspicion of gifts, 
embodied in its formal delivery requirements, reflects a general preference for 
“contract” relations over “status” relations, and for arm’s-length transfers over 
gifts in which the quid pro quo is not clearly defined. Part of the normative un-
derpinning of the common law rules, therefore, is a concern for the inequalities 
of bargaining power and the potential for exploitation that inheres in gift econ-
omies. 
However, an inquiry into the requirements for making a gift in Japan 
would reveal an important legal fact: the strong emphasis on delivery as a ne-
cessary element for effectuating a gift under California law—upon which Toru 
hangs his substantive legal claim that the transfer was invalid—does not exist 
under Japanese law.187 The Japanese law’s lack of suspicion about gifts, embo-
died in its lack of a formal delivery rule or insistence on notarization,188 ex-
presses a very different normative paradigm: namely, that the pooling of re-
sources and noncontractual forms of exchange are expected and normatively 
favored, and hierarchy is not necessarily equated with exploitation. But this 
simple normative clash between Japanese and California gift law looks even 
more complicated if we consider that one of the key insights of feminist legal 
scholarship has been to bring attention to the normative value of altruism, shar-
ing, and relational and affective forms of economic transactions. 
Conflicts doctrine differs crucially from much of the feminism/culture de-
bate in that it does not seek to resolve the question of whether gifts are more or 
less patriarchal and exploitative than contracts as a general matter. It directs our 
attention only to this particular gift, between these particular parties. Thus one 
might ask whether this particular gift was exploitative or empowering of Yo-
shiko. And here, the parties actually agree: Toru testifies that his intent was 
precisely to empower Yoshiko in a context in which he feared that she might 
lose out to her brother. Likewise, Yoshiko interprets this gift as a source of her 
power and authority to act independently. There is, in fact, no conflict about the 
normative question in this case. The insight here—at once highly practical and 
deeply profound—in turn reflects a subtle recognition that no single value sys-
tem can possibly have all the answers all the time; indeed, the insight is that to 
allow any one system to win out in absolute terms would often be unwise at 
best and unjust at worst. 
Like philosophical pragmatism189 or practical reasoning in legal femin-
ism,190 then, conflicts takes on the particularities of the individual case. The 
 
187. See supra note 126. 
188. But see J. MARK RAMSEYER & MINORU NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC 
APPROACH 46-47 (1999). 
189. See, e.g., AMÉLIE OKSENBERG RORTY, MIND IN ACTION 274 (1988), quoted in Bar-
tlett, supra note 183, at 851 n.82. 
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technical approach differs from pragmatism in a number of ways, however. For 
example, conflicts does not attempt to resolve the case at large, taking all fac-
tors into account at once; instead, it slices the issues up to create manageable 
smaller units to be combined later. 
Practically speaking, this slicing move also gives us a handle on the poten-
tially endless complexity of deep reflexivity. The judge need not have a full 
understanding of the foreign culture. Her task, at the end of the day, is not to 
say what the gift ultimately means in Japan or how the corporation is intert-
wined with the family.191 The judge’s task, instead, is to decide the limited 
question of whether Yoshiko or Toru should have the ultimate right to render 
decisions for this corporation. 
4. “As if” (II)—as if the conflict could disappear 
But perhaps the most shocking move in conflicts—and the one that is most 
controversial in the discipline itself—is the move simply to act “as if” the con-
flict of values was not a conflict at all. The European and American traditions 
perform this move in different ways, but each achieves similar miraculous re-
sults and is subject to similar political and theoretical criticisms. In U.S. con-
flict of laws, one standard move when faced with an apparent clash of cultural 
values is to question whether, notwithstanding the fact that the conflict may 
suggest such a clash, the interests at stake in effectuating those values are not 
actually in conflict in this case. The move here is to introduce a key concept in-
to the debate—the notion of disinterestedness. The term “false conflict” refers 
to the situation where there is a conflict at a general normative or legal level, 
but there is not actually a conflict between the laws as applied to this particular 
dispute, because no more than one jurisdiction is actually interested in seeing 
its norms effectuated in this particular case.192 
For example, if we characterize this dispute as a matter of gift law, then we 
find that Toru is asking the court to apply California law to this issue, and is 
arguing that his gift failed because under California law delivery is required to 
effectuate a gift, and the fact that he retained control over the shares meant that 
the shares were not in fact delivered. Yoshiko, meanwhile, is asserting that Jap-
anese law should apply to this issue because under Japanese law delivery is not 
a necessary element of a legally recognizable gift. 
At a surface level, there is most definitely a conflict between Japanese and 
California gift law, since the laws differ. Yet the U.S. conflicts lawyer next 
 
190. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 183, at 849; Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist 
and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699 (1990). 
191. Cf. Marilyn Strathern, A Community of Critics? Thoughts on New Knowledge, 12 
J. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. 191, 204 (2006) (“[J]udges in truth do not distort 
anthropological knowledge, for it is not placed before the courts as knowledge in which they 
need to have any informed interest.”). 
192. HAY ET AL., supra note 165, at 30 & n.15. 
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proceeds to ask, “Is there actually a conflict as concerns the application of these 
laws to this particular dispute?” In order to answer this question, we first ask 
whom California law, with its stringent delivery requirements, aims to protect. 
The answer is that it aims to protect gift givers from being tricked or manipu-
lated into giving something away against their better judgment. On the other 
hand, whom does Japanese law, with its lack of such requirements, aim to pro-
tect? The answer arguably is the reverse—gift receivers who have relied on 
promises from gift givers. Now in this case, the gift receiver has made her life 
in California, where she lives and works, and Japan therefore has relatively lit-
tle interest in protecting her. Conversely, the gift giver is a Japanese national 
living in Japan, and California has relatively little interest in him. Thus both ju-
risdictions are in fact disinterested in seeing their own law applied, and an ac-
tual conflict does not exist.193 
This is another difference between a conflicts paradigm and Shachar’s mul-
ticultural-jurisdictions paradigm, which divides up the balance of authority be-
tween the state and the cultural group and sticks to the terms of this bargain re-
gardless of the specifics of the concrete dispute. Conflicts, in contrast, 
recognizes that even if as a general matter a jurisdiction should have authority 
in a particular area, in some cases that jurisdiction may not have an interest in 
applying its law. Why, for example, should we apply a group’s patriarchal 
membership rules if it turns out that the group is indifferent to whether they are 
applied in the given case? 
Now it will be obvious that this kind of interest analysis involves some-
thing of a sleight of hand. To say that California law’s delivery requirements 
only aim to protect gift givers and that Japan’s lack of such requirements aims 
to protect gift receivers is an “as if” assertion. That is, although it is not neces-
sarily false, it is not necessarily true, and it cannot be refuted.194 Nevertheless, 
if we act “as if” this assertion holds, the conflict disappears in this particular 
case. 
In the civil law tradition, in which state interests do not play as prominent a 
role in conflicts analysis, other “as if” devices are available. In German conflict 
of laws, for example, the court might resort to the “as if” that what the parties 
actually had in mind was a “name-only” transfer of the shares, as a way to 
maintain both the corporation and the family. The doctrine of “acting under the 
wrong law” (Handeln unter falschem Recht),195 as it is called, is intended to 
account for situations in which parties set up their legal affairs with a law in 
mind other than the one that actually applies. In such situations, foreign law is 
 
193. Technically, a case in which neither jurisdiction has an interest is termed an “un-
provided for” case, and the term “false conflict” is reserved for cases in which only one ju-
risdiction has an interest in applying its law. See id. 
194. See infra Part IV. 
195. KEGEL & SCHURIG, supra note 184; see also CORNELIA MÜNZER, HANDELN UNTER 
FALSCHEM RECHT (1992). 
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not actually applied, but is taken into account. Examples include cases in which 
officers of a corporation acted as though it were an English corporation even 
though, under German principles of choice of law, the applicable law remained 
German law.196 Now, given that the civil law tradition is far more focused on 
individual rights than on state interests, it is no surprise that the German me-
thod of “acting as if the conflict disappears” focuses much more on an “as if” 
ascription of the parties’ intent. And again, this is not to say that such intent is 
necessarily false—it may well have been what Toru and Yoshiko intended. But 
again, this doctrine is open to the same kind of challenge: What does it mean to 
say the parties intended one thing and did another? Why would they now dis-
pute this? The fuzziness of this doctrine is precisely what makes it an attractive 
technique for tackling cultural conflicts.197 
More importantly, this doctrine captures something powerful about how 
individuals who move across borders experience culture clash, something we 
might term “transposition.” Individuals do not always mix and match cultures 
through deliberate acts of choice. Instead, individuals transpose cultures, only 
semiconsciously seeing one culture through the lens of another, understanding 
and organizing their lives in accordance with a system of norms from else-
where. This is different from the idea of hybridity, ubiquitous in post-
essentialist debates about feminism and culture, which emphasizes the blending 
of cultural elements. The “acting under the wrong law” doctrine, in contrast, 
draws attention to how actors knowingly or unknowingly shift or superimpose 
cultural elements. 
5. The ethical moment—public policy 
The final step in a conflict of laws analysis picks up the recognition that 
there must be a decision—an ethical moment, as we called it in our discussion 
of Susan Moller Okin’s framing of the issue as equality versus culture. Ordina-
rily, conflicts proceeds to apply the chosen law to the relevant issues. However 
in some rare cases, an adjudicator may invoke a “public policy exception” and 
refuse to do so because if the foreign law were applied, it would violate core 
elements of the forum’s values. The public policy exception has been used, for 
example, to avoid the recognition of polygamous or gay marriages, or to avoid 
application of foreign laws that discriminate against women. The existence of 
the public policy exception is a way of asking the “how different is too differ-
ent” question, which, as explained above, is so immediate and so central to dis-
 
196. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] July 1, 2002, 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] 204, 2002. 
197. Erik Jayme, Identité culturelle et intégration: le droit international privé postmo-
derne [Cultural Identity and Integration: Postmodern Private International Law], 251 
RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 120-21 (1996). 
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cussions about the right compromise or balance to be struck between feminist 
values and respect for cultural autonomy. 
The public policy exception is considered exceptional, and many critics 
have supported its use only in situations in which the application of foreign law 
would violate a fundamental principle of local justice.198 By contrast, some 
commentators have embraced the public policy exception as a normatively legi-
timate doctrine reflecting the adjudicator’s primary obligation to give effect to 
the norms of her own community.199 Nevertheless, this step of the conflicts 
analysis is important because it represents an ethical moment in which the deci-
sionmaker decides to decide, so to speak. Even when the public policy excep-
tion is invisible, because the dispute is resolved without recourse to it, the exis-
tence of the exception means that the decisionmaker has chosen not to apply it, 
and hence the ethical moment is always reached. Thus, unlike some interven-
tions in the feminism/culture literature, conflicts does not end on a note of criti-
que or complexity; it ultimately decides.  
At the same time, it is also important to recognize that the public policy 
exception does not permit compromise or balancing. If the conflict is funda-
mental, the judge’s only choice is not to apply foreign law to the issue at hand. 
Thus, conflicts ultimately does not have room for policy compromise. Com-
promise is not its style.  
Nor is dialogue, in the potentially transformative sense of some direct 
commentary on the foreign law. The public policy exception does not rest on 
some values claimed to be objective, but explicitly on the values of the decid-
ing court’s community. For the exception to apply, it is sufficient to demon-
strate that the forum’s public policy is violated. The exception thus leaves un-
answered whether the practice in question is objectionable in some objective 
sense, and whether it should be changed in the foreign culture. 
While this final step represents an ethical moment, the feel here is quite un-
like the Okin-style framing of ethical moments. We have already shown how 
through the processual layering of its techniques, conflicts analysis systemati-
cally defers and thus ironically often ultimately resolves the opposition between 
feminism and culture. Although the public policy question always appears at 
the end, it need not bear all of the weight. 
Moreover, if the judge does reach the public policy question, its treatment 
holds still further opportunities to narrow or resolve the opposition between 
feminism and culture. The judge may approach the potential conflict with pub-
lic policy in the concrete rather than in the abstract (dealing only with this par-
ticular case rather than the foreign law in general). For example, recognizing 
polygamy in general may be oppressive to women, but recognizing a polygam-
ous union between particular parties may not be oppressive with respect to par-
 
198. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 90 cmt. c (1971). 
199. Cf. LUTHER L. MCDOUGAL, III ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 160 (5th ed. 
2001).  
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ticular issues, such as inheritance rights.200 In addition, the public policy analy-
sis may involve a reflexive exercise akin to relativist critiques of feminists like 
Okin: the judge must interrogate her own community’s laws to determine 
whether the public policy conflict is deep-seated and fundamental, or is super-
ficial and belies an underlying similarity.201 
 
IV. “AS IF”: LEGAL THEORY THROUGH TECHNIQUE 
To be clear, we are not suggesting that every feminism/culture problem 
should be turned into an actual doctrinal conflicts problem, or that theorists of 
feminism and culture need to become conflicts lawyers. What interests us here 
is how legal theory might be revitalized if it took on board some of the ethos, 
the habitus, the style of conflicts, as a modality of theorizing. 
In seeing conflict of laws as fruitful for understanding, structuring, or deal-
ing with value pluralism202 or legal pluralism,203 our argument allies with re-
cent work by several other scholars. For those authors, however, the promise of 
conflicts lies in the big picture summoned up by more fashionable policy-
driven approaches to the field and typical of public law, whereas for us, its 
promise is largely in the démodées techniques typical of traditional private 
law.204 The legal techniques we have described emanate from historical tradi-
tions of argument and interpretation, and are learned and taught through prac-
tices of professionalization varying from formalized legal education to guild-
like mentorship. One important dimension of this set of skills and evaluative 
criteria is a sense of constraint: only certain uses of the tools, certain argu-
ments, and certain analogies will do when thinking through political problems. 
 
200. Different European countries have taken different public policy approaches to re-
cognizing the dissolution of a marriage abroad based on the husband’s unilateral request. See 
Marie-Claire Foblets, The Admissibility of Repudiation: Recent Developments in Dutch, 
French and Belgian Private International Law, 5 HAWWA 10 (2007). 
201. See Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 
2d 1181, 1187 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (engaging in reflexive analysis of the way its decision might 
be perceived abroad before ruling that the First Amendment right to free speech trumps 
French bans on racist speech), rev’d en banc on other grounds, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 
2006). 
202. See Martha Minow & Joseph William Singer, In Favor of Foxes: Pluralism as 
Fact and Aid to the Pursuit of Justice, 90 B.U. L. REV. 903, 909-16 (2010). 
203. See Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1155 
(2007) [hereinafter Berman, Global Legal Pluralism]; Paul Schiff Berman, The New Legal 
Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 225 (2009) [hereinafter Berman, The New Legal Plu-
ralism]; Jayme, supra note 197; Horatia Muir Watt, Experiences from Europe: Legal Diver-
sity and the Internal Market, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J. 429 (2004); see also Ralf Michaels, Global 
Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 243, 248-49 (2009). 
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Another is a practical sense that one’s own professional agency, with respect to 
any particular problem, is constrained at least to some degree by the possibili-
ties and the limitations of one’s tools. All of this adds up to a particular habitus, 
a particular modality of thinking through political problems, in which the tools 
are in the foreground, no matter how large or unwieldy the political conflict 
might be. We term this mode “theory through technique,” to capture the affect, 
and aesthetics, through which theoretical problems are captured and processed. 
Before moving to the implications of our argument for the impasse in fe-
minism, we want to address a likely objection to our argument so far: does our 
fascination with the wondrous possibilities of the technical not ignore how 
technicalities often obscure or dilute political conflict?205 After all, the key in-
sight of legal realism was precisely that technical legal form sanitizes social 
conflict, turning real questions of whose interests should be favored—the inter-
ests of, say, fathers and daughters—into technical questions of, say, the transju-
risdictional enforceability of gift agreements. And of course, conflict of laws 
comes with its own baggage: it bears responsibility, arguably, for upholding 
slavery and for tolerating and even furthering Nazi laws, all under the veil of 
formalist considerations like sovereignty and the equivalence of different pri-
vate law rules.206 
One version of the objection might note that our interest in private law 
techniques rather than more administrative and managerial approaches to mul-
ticultural accommodation exaggerates the divide between public and private, 
and ignores the ways in which private law moves are always intricately en-
meshed in public law regimes of administration, regulation, and enforce-
ment.207 Indeed, the public/private distinction has long attracted these sorts of 
critiques from feminists.208  
Another version of the critique might query the unintended consequences 
of the techniques we have described. The experience of many colonial societies 
with the importation of seemingly neutral private law demonstrates how devic-
es such as property-recording systems or background contract rules can become 
 
205. See, e.g., PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 111-12 (1998). For a de-
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forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 16-20), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/            
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1408522. 
206. See, e.g., PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND 
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207. See Joseph William Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. REV. 1, 110 (1989) (arguing 
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tools of hegemony and exploitation.209 Likewise, feminists have demonstrated 
that these consequences persist in international development assistance 
projects—even those specifically aimed at “investing in women.”210 On the 
other hand, as Prabha Kotiswaran has shown for the case of sex workers in 
Calcutta, very large questions of women’s welfare often turn on technical dif-
ferences in background local laws governing landlord-tenant relations.211 How 
can one tell whether technologies are “good” or “bad”? How do we know 
whether these techniques we have described open up space for a new kind of 
political contestation or shut that space down? 
A related possible objection to our argument, emerging out of the legal 
realist tradition, concerns the malleability of legal technique. As discussed ear-
lier in the context of characterization, the field of conflicts was, in fact, the 
showcase for the legal realist demonstration that formal legal rules do not con-
strain ethical decisionmaking—because rules are subject to multiple levels of 
exceptions, because choices must be made between competing rules, because 
there is ambiguity in how facts should be related to applicable rules, because 
the content of rules is subject to contestation in the process of analogizing the 
facts at hand to existing case law or in the hermeneutics of statutory interpreta-
tion, and much more.212 The technical doctrine of conflicts, in this view, is 
largely incoherent, and judges manipulate it at will to reach whatever results 
they wish to reach.213 From this point of view, what we need is not more em-
phasis on the technical, but more honest conversation about the political con-
flicts and choices at stake.214 Another related concern might be that conflicts 
methods fail to wrestle adequately with the indeterminacy of culture. The 
process of finding foreign law seems to make truth claims about domestic or 
foreign cultures that are in fact highly contestable and highly politicized repre-
sentations. 
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These critiques are not wrong in our view. It is just that they fail to appre-
ciate the extent to which practitioners of conflicts reasoning are aware of the 
limitations of their tools. Hence, the critiques miss the creative paradox of con-
flicts reasoning as self-conscious impossibility. 
Consider, for example, the problem of proving foreign law. As we saw in 
our hypothetical case, it was far from clear what the “law of Japan” was on the 
status of “name-only” gifts. Ask three experts and you are likely to get three 
answers.215 The problem the legal decisionmaker encounters here is precisely 
the invention-of-tradition problem: there is no singular thing called “Japanese 
culture” or “Japanese law.” There are only competing norms, competing inter-
ests, and competing interpretive traditions and institutions. When Toru asks the 
court to honor Japanese law, therefore, he is also simultaneously making a dis-
cursive claim for a particular version of Japanese law and cultural tradition, one 
Yoshiko might contest. So as legal realist critics might point out, even this sim-
ple technical step of “finding and proving foreign law” turns out to be a highly 
malleable, highly contested, even relatively incoherent mess. 
Conflict of laws is hardly naive about these challenges and limitations, 
however, as we have already seen with characterization. On the contrary, al-
most every conflicts textbook dutifully walks students through the manipulabil-
ity of doctrine, the impossible double binds, and the incoherence and multip-
licity of rules. In the United States, not only was conflicts one of the premier 
doctrinal sites of the legal realist revolution, those revolutionaries—Cook, Lo-
renzen, Yntema, Cavers—remain the revered icons of the field.216 Far from 
having a case of critical amnesia, the discipline today is an improbable mix of 
doctrinal tools paired with normative and practical critiques of those tools. The 
discipline comes prepackaged with its own critiques. 
What we have then is a discipline that asks its practitioners to self-
consciously engage in an impossible exercise: to find foreign law, recognizing 
that there is really no such thing to be found. And yet the judge must do the im-
possible, recognizing that it is an impossibility: she must ultimately find the 
foreign law to be this or that. 
This move of doing the impossible, knowing full well that it is impossible, 
is not unique to conflicts. It is one of the key modalities of private law reason-
ing.217 Borrowing from Hans Vaihinger, Lon Fuller named this modality “as- 
if” legal thought.218 In The Philosophy of “As If,”219 Vaihinger defined an “as 
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if” as knowledge that is consciously false and hence, for this very reason, irre-
futable.220 Such “as ifs,” he argued, enable forms of agreement and imagination 
in all aspects of knowledge.221 In mathematics, for example, the concept of a 
line is an “as if,” since mathematicians work with lines as one-dimensional 
while knowing that such infinitely thin lines do not exist in reality. And yet act-
ing “as if” there is such a thing as a line in the mathematical sense allows for all 
of the insights of geometry.222 Likewise, a legal fiction differs from a hypothe-
sis because it cannot be proved or disproved.223 Vaihinger draws attention to 
the delicate epistemological stance of the “as if”—to its subtle, ambivalent 
“tension.” The “as if” is neither true nor not true, he insisted, but rather is itself 
the tension between what is true and not true.224 It is this tension, for Vaihinger, 
that is the fountain of all growth in knowledge: “The ‘As if’ world, which is 
formed in this manner, the world of the ‘unreal’ is just as important as the 
world of the so-called real or actual (in the ordinary sense of the word); indeed 
it is far more important for ethics and aesthetics.”225 Vaihinger calls for re-
maining open to what he terms the “as if” quality of knowledge rather than cri-
tiquing its distance from reality: “We can only say that objective phenomena 
can be regarded as if they behaved in such and such a way, and there is abso-
lutely no justification for assuming any dogmatic attitude and changing the ‘as 
if’ into a ‘that.’”226 
In the context of the problems of representation, cultural description, and 
hybridity that pervade debates about feminism and multiculturalism, this “as if” 
modality has a special salience. Unlike even postmodern feminists who fashion 
vocabulary after vocabulary to try to capture the hybrid, polyphonic, fluid cha-
racter of cosmopolitan cultural life, as though the latest vocabulary could final-
ly nail it, conflicts takes a different tack on the same problem: it willfully aban-
dons the project of describing the “truth” about culture. Conflicts turns its back 
on truth not by refusing to “find the law,” but by finding it in an “as if” modali-
ty: that is, conflicts recognizes all the while (crucially) that its own representa-
tions about, say, Japanese law or culture, are only fictions. 
The contribution of conflicts to the debates and problems of multicultural-
ism, then, is the suggestion that we act “as if” it were possible to turn an irre-
solvable political conflict into a narrowly tailored and technically specific 
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one.227 We do not resolve the question of whether feminist values trump other 
normative concerns, or even whether, say, the rights of girls to education trump 
other local economic imperatives. We seek only to answer the question of 
whether this particular claim should be heard with respect to these parties and 
these specific issues according to this particular set of doctrinal categories.  
One way of thinking about this approach is as an “as if” constraint of legal 
form.228 The insight of conflicts methodologies is that the tools sometimes ex-
ceed themselves, if we allow them to do so. It may be that limiting the possibil-
ities at one methodological or disciplinary level creates inadvertent surprises, 
unexpected discoveries in other places. For legal scholars and lawyers this 
means recommitting to law, as opposed to, say, popular culture, or cultural 
theory, or fiction, as a medium of social change.  
However, and importantly, this submission to the constraint of this legal 
form is always done with full realization that the issues cannot really be cor-
doned off this way—that they are in fact related to many other problems, and 
conflicts, and doctrines, and political imaginations. It is done with full apprec-
iation that indeed the very question of how you slice—how you characterize the 
issues—is highly malleable. Hence it is crucial that the “as if” modality of en-
gagement with legal technique never devolve into blind formalism. As Vaihin-
ger insists, one must fight to maintain the uncomfortable tension of “as if” and 
not allow it to devolve into “is,” or even worse, into “ought.” This suggests 
how the “as if” modality of legal technique can be its own kind of ethical 
commitment in the context of the shifting terrain of cosmopolitan politics. The 
point of form is not, in other words, to avoid questions of values and politics, 
but the exact opposite: to provide us with a language within which to formulate, 
assess, and ultimately resolve, at least for the specific case, clashes of values 
that would remain irresoluble if taken in another way. 
Indeed, in conflicts, the merely “as if” nature of the constraint of form is 
expressed doctrinally in the availability of the public policy exception as a ne-
cessary element of ethical choice at the close of the analysis. There will come a 
point at which the “as if” must stop. But as we argued in the previous Subpart, 
we think it is significant that this moment occurs at the end of the analysis, after 
the techniques have had their moment of agency. 
What we are calling legal theory as technique, then, is an approach to poli-
tics that is purposely oblique for the moment. To paraphrase a comment made 
to us by Chantal Thomas, it is an approach that (temporarily) tries out the inde-
terminacy of formalism as a respite from the up-front and head-on certainty of 
politics. In this respect, “as if” thinking is very different from, say, narrative or 
contextualizing modalities of thought that dominate feminist and cultural 
theory. Professionalism at the level of the constraint of form allows for a cer-
 
227. Cf. Robyn Wiegman, Feminism’s Apocalyptic Futures, 31 NEW LITERARY HIST. 
805, 822 (2000) (calling for “feminism in the meantime”). 
228. See infra note 236. 
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tain creative amateurism, or experimentation, at the level of the political and 
cultural encounter. 
V. FEMINISM AS TECHNIQUE 
The problem of culture is a central problem for feminist legal theory. Thus 
far, this Article has sought to demonstrate how the conflict of laws mode might 
respond. We are also intrigued by the implications of responding in this mode 
for feminist legal theory writ large. What we would like to call “feminism as 
technique” is appealing to us in part because it refuses to dissolve the opposi-
tion between feminist values and cultural concerns through any of the three 
common strategies introduced in Part I, namely dialogue, tolerance, and com-
promise. In this Part, we join with important voices who have raised doubts 
about some or all of these commitments and show how conflicts offers one pic-
ture of an alternative. 
A.  No Dialogue, No Tolerance, No Compromise 
1. No dialogue 
As described earlier, faced with conflicting political positions or cultural 
communities, many feminist approaches stage a dialogue of one kind or another 
between differently situated women.229 In the context of cultural relativism and 
the self-reflexive recognition that “we” and “they” both face the dilemma of 
culturally conditioned choice,230 the dialogue may aim simply at shared under-
standing. In comparison, feminists drawing on the post-essentialist conception 
of culture as “invented tradition” often ascribe transformational value to institu-
tional arrangements or procedural solutions aimed at dialogue, arguing that 
they will bring the particular cultural community’s norms into closer alignment 
with gender equality.231 For these feminists, the idea that culture is already a 
fluid, contested, and changing set of values and practices implies that transfor-
mation is not at odds with respect for culture. 
In contrast, one of the core insights of poststructuralist, queer, and postco-
lonial feminisms is that dialogue with dignity is not always possible, and de-
manding dialogue can have its own unintended and hegemonic conse-
quences.232 For example, the legal philosopher Mikhail Xifaras argues that the 
notion of dialogue with the “other” through law partakes of an imperial “Na-
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poleonic” ideal in which “others” are slowly incorporated and rationalized 
through legal discourse. For Xifaras, following Rancière on this point, dissen-
sus and struggle are fundamental to politics, and hence proposals for dialogue 
that posit even a fantasy of the end of dissensus are in fact dangerously apoliti-
cal.233 
While the conflicts approach to multiculturalism may in fact achieve 
shared understandings and enable uncanny alliances—that is, while it may in 
fact foster dialogue—it does not explicitly aim to do so. Its objectives are much 
more modest and far less utopian. It aims only to bring the current dispute to an 
(equitable and legally defensible) end.  
It is not that conflicts as a field is uninterested in dialogue, mutual under-
standing, and reciprocity. It is that it chooses to come at these questions side-
ways—by foregrounding other more technical legal questions. To illustrate, a 
false conflicts analysis may indeed generate deference to foreign law.234 And 
the very process of going through a false conflicts analysis ideally demands 
carefully contextualized attention to the purposes and scope of foreign law. 
Hence, the orientation of the analysis is quite different from the view now ad-
vocated by some prominent legal theorists that an understanding of the “other” 
in legal terms is ultimately impossible and even irrelevant as a normative goal 
because legal discourse and practice simply translate everything outside them-
selves into their own existing categories, and therefore serious engagement 
with the “other” need not be attempted at all.235 But although this encounter 
with the “other” may turn out to be expansive, it is nevertheless framed as a 
matter of narrow doctrinal manipulation in order to reach a specific legal end. 
Ironically, we believe, it is the narrow lens, the “constraint of form”236 de-
scribed in Part IV, that ultimately allows for the breadth of the encounter. 
2. No tolerance 
Another core value implicitly or explicitly underlying much of the multi-
culturalism debate is tolerance.237 In Regulating Aversion, Wendy Brown arti-
culates a powerful critique of the seemingly benign emphasis on tolerance of 
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other value systems in American political life.238 The surface-level egalitarian 
ethos of tolerance, Brown points out, hides a pernicious hierarchy: one only to-
lerates those whom one believes to be in some sense inferior to oneself.239 
Martha Minow likewise has illustrated how “tolerance presents the dilemma of 
its own limits.”240 As she puts it, “Liberal tolerance has always struck me as a 
second-best, a kind of ‘putting up with’ difference that falls short of genuine 
respect. Tolerance implies an imbalance of power: some have the power to 
grant—or withhold—tolerance toward others.”241 
From a different vantage point, the anthropologist James Weiner has criti-
qued the essentialist underpinnings of tolerance.242 Echoing the insights of the 
invented-tradition literature, he reminds us that the very differences that get the 
debate over multiculturalism going are often products of the interventions of 
the state law apparatus through the “tremendous burgeoning of the institutional 
relationships, buttressings, laws, procedures, and so on, between any indigen-
ous community and . . . governments, companies, [and] non-government orga-
nisations.”243 If one truly takes this insight seriously, Weiner argues, then the 
very idea of recognition and tolerance is somewhat nonsensical since the dif-
ferences to be tolerated are actually products of the institutions of toleration.244 
One of the attractions of the conflicts approach in our view is that tolerance 
is simply not part of its vocabulary. Of course, as in the case of dialogue, con-
flicts may result in tolerance of a kind: the forum may choose to defer to anoth-
er value system even on issues of deep concern to the forum’s own political 
community. As Weiner suggests, the technical machinations of state law gener-
ate their own cultural effects.245 Yet conflicts does not aim at toleration.246 It 
aims at resolving a particular conflict. 
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One doctrinal marker of the conflicts alternative to toleration discussed ear-
lier is the public policy exception. As we indicated, the doctrines of conflicts 
are invoked always with the awareness that what we term an ethical moment 
must come to pass: the decisionmaker must decide whether to stand by the re-
sults of doctrine or to disregard them. But if this option is always on the table, it 
is refined, limited, and postponed. 
Again, conflicts’ seeming lack of awareness of the wider political and theo-
retical imperatives at stake in a choice between normative systems makes it a 
refreshing alternative to the tolerance that Brown and Minow cogently describe 
as an orientation that, while well-intentioned, often slips into its own form of 
self-righteousness. 
3. No compromise 
A third thread that runs through much of the feminism/culture debate is the 
search for the perfectly calibrated middle ground. Many public law doctrines 
for thinking about the accommodation of feminism and multiculturalism expli-
citly deploy frameworks such as balancing tests that turn this normative imper-
ative into a methodology. Here, the idea is that it is the job of the scholar, 
judge, or policymaker to find the perfectly calibrated balance between opposing 
interests, to split the baby precisely in two, to find the sweet spot at which all 
sides give up precisely appropriate amounts in favor of the common good. Re-
call, for example, Shachar’s slicing of jurisdiction between the minority and the 
state so as to transform culture from within over time by “equipping members 
with means of combating unjust internal restrictions.”247 Some conflicts scho-
lars have advocated similar approaches to conflicts.248 
These approaches are clearly well-intended. But as Carol Greenhouse ar-
gues about this “discourse of solutions,” it also inadvertently sets the liberal 
state up as the arbiter of the middle ground.249 As Prabha Kotiswaran further 
suggests, there is both a lack of theoretical rigor and a certain arrogance, a se-
duction toward “governance mode,”250 in this search for the middle ground—a 
sense that it is the scholar’s or policymaker’s privilege and duty to find the bal-
ance point, as if we scholars and policymakers were not already invested in one 
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(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 (1987). 
247. SHACHAR, supra note 77, at 14. 
248. See, e.g., Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 203; Berman, The New Le-
gal Pluralism, supra note 203; see also Minow & Singer, supra note 202. 
249. See CAROL J. GREENHOUSE, THE PARADOX OF RELEVANCE: ETHNOGRAPHY AND 
CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 142, 170-73 (2011). 
250. See Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, Hila Shamir & Chantal Thomas, From the 
International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and 
Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 335, 410-11 (2006). 
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side or the other, as if we came to the table without our own normative com-
mitments built in. And as a practical matter, the proliferation of such proposals 
suggests the difficulty—dare we say the impossibility—of finding such middle 
ground. Here again, while conflict of laws does not oppose compromise as an 
end result—after all, decisional harmony is sometimes mentioned as an impor-
tant goal of all conflicts decisions—it does not explicitly seek it. 
B. Feminism in the Conflicts Style 
In light of the problems with proposals to find the middle ground, what we 
find appealing about the conflicts approach is the adherence to the constraints 
of technical form, with all its faux, tongue-in-cheek depoliticization of the is-
sues.251 Rather than opening up all the politics and choosing a middle way, 
conflicts methodologies actually point away from substance for a moment.  
It is an oblique response, but again one that we believe institutionalizes in-
to a practice a strong form of recognition of one’s own situatedness in the con-
flicts at issue. The conflicts judge has no illusions of being above the fray; she 
entertains no ambition to choose an objective middle ground. She refuses that 
task—but she does not refuse to reach a legal conclusion. Again, in contrast 
with Shachar’s proposal, the conflicts move we call “slicing” is effectuated in a 
far less instrumental modality.252 Conflicts, too, slices the problem down, re-
cognizing that one normative system might trump for some purposes, and 
another might trump for other purposes. But the aim is not to transform the oth-
er system. It is rather to resolve the technical question of what law applies to 
the case at hand. 
The appeal of the “as if” modality already has a strong feminist pedigree. 
The postmodern feminist political philosopher Rosi Braidotti has described her 
approach to philosophy as an “as if” modality of theorization, akin to inhabiting 
a nomadic identity.253 She argues that this “as if” modality can be a tool for 
opening up transformative possibilities:  
It is as if some experiences were reminiscent or evocative of others; this abili-
ty to flow from one set of experiences to another is a quality of interconnec-
tedness that I value highly. . . . [N]omadic becoming is neither reproduction 
nor just imitation, but rather emphatic proximity, intensive interconnectedness. 
Some states or experiences can merge simply because they share certain 
attributes.254 
 
251. It will be apparent that for this reason, unlike some other progressive conflicts 
scholars, we prefer those conflicts methodologies—traditional and modern—that constrain 
and limit the issues to those that open up the issues and face their politics head on. 
252. As noted earlier, another important distinction is that Shachar is slicing jurisdiction 
and not choice of law. See supra notes 77-78, 178-79, 247, and accompanying text. 
253. See ROSI BRAIDOTTI, NOMADIC SUBJECTS: EMBODIMENT AND SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 
IN CONTEMPORARY FEMINIST THEORY (1994). 
254. Id. at 5-6. 
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Her discussion of the counterintuitive possibilities that inhere in turning 
away from the “real” help to articulate what legal technique has to offer philos-
ophy. For her, the “as if” of the nomadic legal subject 
allows me to think through and move across established categories and levels 
of experience: blurring boundaries without burning bridges. Implicit in my 
choice is the belief in the potency and relevance of the imagination, of myth-
making, as a way to step out of the political and intellectual stasis of these 
postmodern times. Political fictions may be more effective, here and now, than 
theoretical systems.255 
The “as if” also has strong proponents among both theorists of culture and 
feminist theorists who have struggled with the question of what an ethical re-
presentational politics might look like. Since the work of Edmund Leach,256 
Vaihinger has gained a following among generations of anthropologists search-
ing for ways of responding to critiques of representation in that field. The anth-
ropologist and cultural theorist Roy Wagner, for example, has described Vai-
hinger’s “as if” as the basis for cultural description after postmodernism: “A 
relative perspective within the province of cultural construction, taking the refe-
rentialism of the symbol, the ‘is’ of convention, as a kind of subjunctive, is to 
enter a tentative suspension—Vaihinger’s world of ‘as if.’”257 
The feminist anthropologist Marilyn Strathern points out that the epistemo-
logical openness and ambivalence of the “as if”—whether in ritual practice or 
in ethnographic writing—is enabled by a rigidity at the level of form.258 That 
is, people substitute agreement about “the truth” with agreement to act or argue 
or sing or dress or analyze or write according to a very specific set of aesthetic 
criteria. The analogue to legal technique concerns the way one might embrace 
the ambiguity of legal argumentation while still conforming carefully to the cri-
teria of what constitutes a good argument—rather than, say, abandoning legal 
argumentation altogether for policy arguments, or for that matter, political 
theory arguments, poetry, or political demonstrations in the streets. In a later 
work, Strathern specifically describes legal tools as “non-epistemological” 
knowledge: legal technique, in her view, is knowledge that self-consciously 
does not describe the world but rather serves as a “tool” within that world.259 In 
our view, this “non-epistemological” or nonrepresentational quality of the “as 
if” of legal technique—the way it papers over description—is a crucial element 
of its transformative power. 
 
255. Id. at 4. 
256. See E.R. LEACH, POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF HIGHLAND BURMA: A STUDY OF KACHIN 
SOCIAL STRUCTURE 285 (2d ed. 1964). 
257. ROY WAGNER, SYMBOLS THAT STAND FOR THEMSELVES 9 (1986). 
258. See STRATHERN, supra note 236, at 180-81. 
259. See MARILYN STRATHERN, KINSHIP, LAW AND THE UNEXPECTED: RELATIVES ARE 
ALWAYS A SURPRISE 111 (2005) (noting “the role played by legal technique in the fabrication 
of persons and things”). 
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This subtle epistemological and ethical stance is quite different from the 
more totalizing and directly instrumental feminist initiatives we have termed 
dialogue, tolerance, and compromise. But it is also different, we believe, from 
projects that have been our own in the past—attempts to describe the conflicts 
between feminism and culture in ever more fine-grained contextual or hybridic 
analyses, for example, or the choice to simply “take a break” from feminism. 
From the point of view of feminism as technique, all these approaches share a 
certain head-on and up-front way of addressing their problems, and hence a 
great ethical and epistemological burden to “get it right”—something quite dis-
tinct from the more oblique and “for the moment” approach of the “as if.” 
Again, we want to emphasize that just because the conflicts perspective re-
jects the authority to define the middle ground does not mean that the deci-
sionmaker has carte blanche to ignore difference, dismiss all attempts to reach 
out beyond one’s own values and vocabularies as a liberal fantasy, and settle 
into a bubble of postmodern legalism in which one safely asserts that the “oth-
er” is unknowable anyway and so why bother. In other words, we want to reject 
the false choice between technocratic managerialism on the one hand and legal 
chauvinism or ironic cynicism on the other. Rather, as we have explained, we 
view the constraint of form as an improbable, but ultimately powerful tool of 
political engagement, one that preserves curiosity by allowing for the unex-
pected and the surprising in the midst of the legal mundane. 
CONCLUSION 
In Germany, France, Britain, and many other societies, the state’s multicul-
turalism policies have become a political flashpoint. Often, what ignites pro-
posals for rollback takes the form of a defense of women. Much the same is 
true in foreign policy debates about the rights of women abroad. If feminism 
has become the bête noire of multiculturalism, the opposite is also true. As we 
described in Part II, the problem of culture—of the very concept itself—has 
mired feminist theory and practice in circles of debate and counterdebate. If the 
political mainstream is concentrated on l’affaire du foulard, girls who vanish 
from school in Britain to be married off in their family’s homeland, or synago-
gue windows in Montreal overlooking a women’s gym260—if President Bush 
included “saving Afghan women” among the justifications for U.S. military ac-
 
260. See GÉRARD BOUCHARD & CHARLES TAYLOR, CONSULTATION COMM’N ON 
ACCOMMODATION PRACTICES RELATED TO CULTURAL DIFFERENCES, BUILDING THE FUTURE: 
A TIME FOR RECONCILIATION 53 (2008). The creation of Quebec’s Consultation Commission 
on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences was prompted by hot-button 
social issues in the province of Quebec, many of which involved women and religion. The 
contentious questions included whether a Montreal YMCA had to install frosted windows in 
its gym to prevent young boys and teenagers studying at the synagogue across the street 
from having a full view of the women exercising. See id. at 45-60.  
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tion in Afghanistan after 9/11261—academic feminism in the West seems to be 
disoriented, even exhausted, in part by multiculturalism. 
And yet, the problems do not go away. The failure of societies to reconcile 
their commitments to gender equality and respect for cultural difference has 
profound consequences for many women’s lives, and also threatens to become 
an increasing source of tension in those societies. At the same time, the aca-
demic downward spiral we have described surrounding feminism/culture analy-
sis has its own consequences. As feminist legal scholars, this issue matters to us 
personally as well as professionally. Simply put, we want to live in an academ-
ic world in which feminist legal theory once again engages our passions and 
aspirations. In short, the crisis around feminism/culture theory matters practi-
cally, politically, and theoretically. 
This Article began by broadening the scope of the debate, showing by ex-
ample that unlikely issues of private law, not commonly coded as either femin-
ist or cultural, can raise the same complications of culture for feminism. Next, 
the Article found help in a similarly unlikely place: the legal technicalities at 
work in conflict of laws. Understood as we suggest, the subtle ethical position-
ing of the conflicts method, effectuated all along in a particular technical aes-
thetic style, offers new energy and opportunity to the feminism/culture quag-
mire. Its very different orientation towards cultural conflict helps us to 
appreciate and advance the strengths of the debate. But conflicts also illumi-
nates the limitations of the taken-for-granted orientations to the problem in fe-
minist theory that we referred to as dialogue, tolerance, and compromise. 
A close look at the intellectual moves at the heart of conflicts doctrines 
suggests that many of these moves are quite avant-garde relative to the state of 
critical and cultural theory. We showed how some of these doctrines take into 
account and amplify some of the cutting-edge insights of feminist cultural 
theory. For example, the very existence of the field of conflict of laws is a re-
minder of the fact that other frameworks for understanding gender and culture 
exist on par with our own.  
We also showed how some of the moves of conflicts as a field actually go 
beyond the current state of critical and cultural theory and suggest new avenues 
for thinking about feminism/culture problems. One example is conflicts’ signal 
move of slicing issue by issue the question of which value system should go-
vern. While feminists who employ contextualism or practical reasoning, for in-
stance, would also refuse to join the politicians in endless debates about head-
scarves and child marriage in general, a conflicts sensibility is distinctive in 
moving to a narrow and technical conversation about the appropriateness of 
this headscarf as concerns this school and this girl at this moment. Slicing sepa-
rates the areas of disagreement and agreement and thus opens up the possibility 
 
261. See, e.g., Ann Russo, The Feminist Majority Foundation’s Campaign to Stop 
Gender Apartheid, 8 INT’L FEMINIST J. POL. 557, 558, 560-62 (2006) (quoting from various 
addresses by President George W. Bush and First Lady Laura Bush). 
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of dealing with each separately. Likewise, the sequenced coupling of a deep 
commitment to the recognition of relativist concerns with what we have termed 
an ethical moment—a final analytical moment of decision and closure—takes 
us beyond both muddled debates about the complexity of representation on the 
one hand and well-intentioned but ultimately somewhat arrogant assertions of 
the primacy of one’s own feminist ethical values on the other. 
Some of the techniques we have described are not unique to conflicts; they 
are part of the private law toolbox. Our interest in private law methodology 
echoes but also advances a growing interest among specialists of international 
law, legal pluralism, and globalization in private law.262 In our view, what ul-
timately defines private law is not a particular rapport with economic transac-
tions, or a particular distance from administrative practice, or a link to the au-
thority and legitimacy of market forces relative to the state, but rather a 
particular set of techniques.263 And although to our knowledge we are the first 
to explore the implications of legal technique for the feminism/culture de-
bate,264 our analysis joins a growing interest in legal technique in areas of law 
more traditionally associated with market relations.265 
 Yet in conflicts these tools take on a particular valence. They become 
ways of grasping a wider conversation about overlapping and contested sove-
reignties, about how to talk about culture after the critiques of essentialism, 
about how to conceptualize agency and power without falling into methodolog-
ical individualism,266 about the linkages, overlaps, and proximities between po-
litical positions and also the points of disconnect. Technique, in short, can 
sometimes be a way of getting at the political in a way that theorizing cannot 
do. Our larger aim in this Article has been to suggest how the constraints of 
technical legal form might open up new ethical, transformative, and interpretive 
possibilities for legal theory. 
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